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This thesis examines the literary features of the Letters to Howard, a series of 
letters to the editor of the Alaskan newspaper, the Tundra Times. Published over the 
course of several months in 1973, the letters were signed by two semi-fictional 
characters: an old Eskimo man, Naugga Ciunerput, and a lost VISTA volunteer, Wally 
Morton, the two lone inhabitants of the imagined Land’s End Village, Alaska. Naugga 
and Wally had a pointed agenda: they were addressing editor Howard Rock and his 
readership with their concerns regarding the newly-passed Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, or ANCSA. In truth, Naugga and Wally’s letters were written by two 
graduate students, Fred Bigjim (an Inupiaq from Nome studying education) and James 
Ito-Adler (a law student who had switched to anthropology). The use of irony in these 
letters is the subject of my analysis here; I focus first on the semantic layers of irony and 
second on its discursive dimensions. This thesis’ ultimate goal is to illuminate the ways 
in which these letters contest history, frame the nature and distribution of power, and 
examine the myriad tensions at play between Native peoples’ historic, cultural, and 
political ties to the land.
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FOREWORD
The title of the collection, Letters to Howard, was published without the definite 
article. For the sake of formality I have used this wording in the title of my thesis,
. Irony in Letters to H ow ard" (instead of . Irony in the Letters to Howard"). 
However, omitting the definite article “the” in the body of this thesis’ discussion leads to 
awkwardness in certain contexts. This is exacerbated by the fact that “Letters’" is plural. 
Unwavering loyalty to the wording of the publication’s title yields such grating phrases 
as, “Letters does," “Letters has," or “Letters is," leading to the discord of sentences like 
this one: “Letters engages the critical faculties of its readers.” In an imperfect effort to 
resolve this problem, I have opted to use the definite article throughout the body of this 
work. Outside of section headings and chapter titles, I thus refer to Bigjim and Ito- 
Adler’s text as “the Letters to Howard," or simply, “the Letters""
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INTRODUCTION
During the spring, summer, and autumn of 1973 a series of letters to the editor 
signed by two semi-fictional characters was published in Alaska’s Tundra Times. The 
letters, all addressed directly to the newspaper editor Howard Rock, were signed by an 
old Eskimo man, Naugga Ciunerput, and a lost VISTA volunteer, Wally Morton, the two 
lone inhabitants of the imagined Land’s End Village, Alaska. Naugga and Wally took to 
the pen out of concern for a particularly abstruse piece of legislation which present-day 
readers may most readily recognize as ANCSA, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 
Naugga and Wally never mentioned it by either of these names, though, refering to it 
consistently as “AN ACT (Public Law 92-203)” and predicting that it would have a 
dramatic and irreversible impact on all villages and all Natives in the state of Alaska. 
Naugga and Wally’s letters were written by two graduate students at Harvard University, 
Fred Bigjim (an Inupiaq from Nome studying education) and James Ito-Adler (a law 
student who had switched to anthropology). In the year following the letters’ appearance 
in the Tundra Times, they were collected and re-published as a book called Letters to 
Howard: An Interpretation o f  the Alaska Native Land Claims (referred to hereafter as the 
Letters).
There are twenty-four letters in the collection. The earliest is dated March 30, 
1973, and the last is from November 26 of the same year. Each letter ranges in length 
from roughly 350 to 650 words. Most are signed by Naugga; however, two are written in 
Wally’s voice and signed by him.
The content of the Letters is three-fold: (1) the Letters communicate what is in AN 
ACT, (2) they explore the implications of AN ACT, and (3) they judge those implications. 
The central purpose of this thesis is to consider the role of literary features in the Letters' 
accomplishment of these three things.
Here is an early example, the second of Naugga and Wally’s letters to appear in 
the Tundra Times.
Land’s End Village 
State of Alaska 
April 10, 1973
Dear Howard:
The mail plane finally got through last week, so I am able to get 
out another letter to you about the problems I am having with the 
Secretary’s plan, AN ACT, about us Alaska Natives. With the help of my 
friend Wally Morton, the ex-VISTA volunteer, I was able to fill out the 
Native Enrollment Form in time, so I guess that qualifies me as a Native 
of Alaska.
A wry humor finds its place in the letter almost immediately. Naugga’s is an 
ironic humor, the substance of which takes shape between his seemingly straight-forward 
delivery and the light sarcasm a reader cannot help but infer. His voice is earnest but 
here, as elsewhere, his meaning cuts two ways.
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Within this brief beginning, Naugga takes his stance as an outsider (at least 
regarding present politics) and a critic, and Wally is set up as the resident expert on 
bureaucratic paperwork. Wally’s role here tacitly raises two problems: his dependability 
is (1) not available or accessible to all Alaska Natives— an unknown proportion are 
certain to need help properly filling out what is likely one of the federal government’s 
characteristically convoluted forms; and (2) absurd in its centrality to the question at 
hand, which is that of Naugga’s being recognized as a Native Alaskan.
In other words, within its first two sentences, this letter sets the scene and 
sketches its characters: Wally has a non-Native background and is conversant if  not 
fluent in bureaucratic ways, Naugga is stubbornly critical of the new legislation and 
grudgingly endeavoring to stay on top of the changes it is bringing about, and this 
unlikely pair are living in a place where letters are posted when weather permits the mail 
plane to fly.
Already, we see the resistance expressed in the Letters unfolding on multiple 
levels. On the surface, Naugga has explicitly set out to discuss problems brought on by 
the legislation. Expressing the same in counterpoint, the irony of Wally’s much- 
appreciated involvement with Naugga’s enrollment as a Native stands as a second layer 
in the critique of the process. And traces of the concrete reality of village life—witnessed 
here in the mention of weather—insist on the primacy of life as it is and conditions as 
they stand, reminding us that the paper reality of a government decree clashes with 




Naugga goes on in this letter to describe a particular section of the enrollment 
form in greater detail:
One of the things that I had to do was fill out a Family Tree which is 
probably so the Secretary can see if  it really has Native Roots. It made me 
sad to do this, because it took me back to the times when we were younger 
and we saw so many of our friends and relatives dying during the time of 
Sickness. Wally is too young to remember those times when the outsiders 
brought their sickness and diseases to our villages. Though it makes me 
sad, it also makes me remember how the survivors opened their hearts and 
homes to adopt the children who were left without parents. We all knew 
our responsibility to each other in those times. I wonder how this will 
appear in the family trees that the Secretary is collecting? Can he build a 
Native Forest out of these paper trees which are taken to represent our 
lives?
The problem underlying the narrative is that Naugga has to prove his Nativeness. 
We see two clashing modes of discourse here. By one logic, Nativeness is a practical 
question resolved by a genealogical exercise. But this logic is incoherent in the discourse 
of a people’s still tangible history of destruction. Naugga gives voice to this latter mode 
of discourse: one thought leads to another and he is soon in the realm of memory and 
reflection. This passage’s simplicity gives clear voice to a profound grief. This more
serious emotional turn makes for a link to the truth, to the substance of being Native as it 
is embodied in the colonial history of the people. The problem of proving Nativeness is 
transformed from being something of a demeaning inconvenience to a tragedy. In 
addition to the historical tragedy, tragic consequences also inhere in the potential to 
ultimately fail in representating the self. The format of this representation, government 
forms, guarantees its unidimensionality, as well as the ensuing anticipation that judgment 
will be harsh against what is so thinly and simplistically represented. A thematic concern 
with arbitrariness thus becomes evident between the lines of Naugga’s questions. The 
tragedy is that Naugga’s Nativeness makes him human, but proving his Nativeness strips 
him of this depth and leaves him all the more vulnerable to powerful, yet arbitrary, 
decisions.
But the letter does not evoke self-pity. Its tone takes a pragmatic turn:
As Wally was helping me, I began to realize that many of my relatives 
would not be able to fill out these Native Enrollment Forms without help.
They are very difficult to understand even if you speak some English. I 
see my friend Wally complaining that he needs a Legalese Dictionary to 
translate the Bureaucratic English in AN ACT which explains all the rules 
and reasons for these forms. Just imagine the problems of a poor old man 
like myself and you will see why I worry about those who did not have 
help before the deadline. Did they become Lost Natives after March 30,
1973, as far as AN ACT is concerned? I guess two years is a long time to
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some people, but out here in the villages it is a short time in a way of life 
that has been going on for as long as anyone knows. Wally says that the 
Secretary refused to extend the enrollment deadline for even 30 days. Did 
he really think that the month of April was so important to his plans when 
he made this plan two years ago?
This section offers explicit judgment on the process of enrollment: the 
bureaucratization of Native heritage is rhetorically revealed as a logistical quagmire. 
Here, the sentence-level posing of questions, ironic self-deprecation, and the practice of 
deflecting authority (rather than claiming it) come together as the unlikely platform for 
Naugga’s position. I call this platform unlikely only because his message is not tentative 
or wavering, nor is it veiled. On the contrary, his judgment of enrollment regulations is 
bold, critical, and quite evident. The three devices of questioning, self-deprecation, and 
the deflection of authority all seem essentially self-undermining, but their combined 
effect is much the opposite. Here I consider each device individually.
Naugga ascribes authority to Wally in much the same way that sources are cited 
in scholarly writing. This has two immediate effects. The first is corroborative: the 
reader is less inclined to be skeptical of a writer’s claims if those claims are also 
made/supported/accepted by others—Naugga’s overall authority is thus reinforced by his 
deferral to Wally on the specific point of the Secretary’s refusal to extend the enrollment 
deadline. The second effect is more complex, raising more questions than it answers. If 
we understand his deflection as a self-marginalizing device, does this imply self-pity on
Naugga’s part? Or does his yielding to Wally’s authority carry ironic undertones, 
implicitly drawing critical attention to race relations, power, and privilege?
Naugga’s use of self-deprecation in this letter raises related questions. He 
describes himself as “a poor old man,” implying that he occupies a status lower than 
either Wally’s, the complex U.S. government’s, or both. But this hierarchical positioning 
carries an ironic edge. It is as if  Naugga is holding his hands up to show his innocence, 
yet he is not shy in pointedly criticizing ANCSA’s enrollment process in the remainder of 
the letter. Thus, self-deprecation paradoxically collides with a critique that, in aggregate, 
reads as confidently outspoken. We can take the paradox as a signal that calls on the 
reader to mentally invert Naugga’s meaning—to understand that the opposite of what he 
says may well have a place among his intended meanings.
Naugga’s self-deprecation is therefore not functioning here as intentionally 
marginalizing: when understood ironically, it is rather a move toward humanizing the 
particular problem of the complexity of the enrollment procedure and revealing the 
insensitivity of the paper bureaucracy to people’s real ties. Consider “a poor old man.”
In the colonial discourse, this phrase might have straight-forward meaning. But in 
another discourse the phrase becomes ironic. When we take “a poor old man” to mean its 
opposite (something like, “a healthy, economically self-sufficient person with a vibrant 
mind and a proclivity for critical thinking”), then the whole of Naugga’s statement—“just 
imagine the problems of a poor old man like myself and you will see why I worry about 
those who did not have help before the deadline”—implies that the enrollment deadline is 
problematic not because deficient people need extra help but because perfectly normal
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people throughout the villages of Alaska will encounter problems just like Naugga’s. We 
see a simple phrase simultaneously echoing on two planes in two discourses, recalling the 
personalized irony of much Native American traditional narrative and contemporary 
humor. In this way the problem is subtly lodged not with the people but with the 
bureaucracy.
Finally, we can turn from the deflection of authority and self-deprecation to 
sentence-level questions. The two questions posed in this section of Naugga’s April 10 
letter begin to embody the philosophical underpinnings of the social and political critique 
advanced by the Letters as a collected work. The first question (“did they become Lost 
Natives after March 30, 1973, as far as AN ACT is concerned?”) exposes an instance of 
ambiguity in the legislation. By modeling a mode of critique in their treatment of 
ANCSA, the Letters are functioning as a broader lesson in reading, questioning, and 
problematizing legal documents at a time when governmental regulations are becoming 
increasingly more relevant to Native Alaskans’ lives. But the questions also lead us 
closer to the core of that critique, revealing a thematic concern raised throughout the 
Letters. The second question (“did he really think that the month of April was so 
important to his plans when he made this plan two years ago?”) carries similar weight, 
but as a gesture toward arbitrariness. Both questions in this passage invoke the Letters' 
central abstract concerns. The question form is less confrontational than a declarative 
allegation. But the questions ride directly on the project’s philosophical underpinnings in 
the problematics of ambiguity and arbitrariness, reinforcing the senses and feelings that 




Finally there is one more thing that has been bothering me about 
Enrollment under AN ACT. What is wrong with all our children and 
grandchildren who are being born since AN ACT was passed? Are babies 
born after December 18, 1971, to Natives somehow less Native than those 
born before this date? On paper they are not Natives as far as AN ACT is 
concerned. As a family ends when there are no more children to carry on, 
what happens to a people when they do not claim their descendants? Are 
we setting brother against brother according to their birth dates?
It is important to pause here for a brief historical note: Congress passed the 
ANCSA Amendments of 1987 (Public Law 100-241) in early 1988. Among other things, 
this amendment addressed the “new Natives” issue that Naugga brings up in his letter, 
that of Natives born after December 18, 1971. This amendment authorized the issuance 
of additional stock to Natives who missed the official enrollment of eligible shareholders 
in the ANCSA corporations, and includes those who missed the deadline because they 
were born subsequently to the enactment of ANCSA. Still, at the time of the Letters' 
publication, this issue was one of ANCSA’s more troubling elements for those concerned 
with the long-term implications of the legislation and the generations of people who 
would live with its effects without having participated in its inception.
Naugga ends his letter with the following:
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I am sorry, Howard, for carrying on about these problems because as 
Wally says—many lawyers must have spent much time and money to 
settle these questions. But even though this old man may be ignorant he 
knows who he is without seeing the papers on the Secretary’s desk and he 
knows who his people are and how to act toward them. Even though 
Wally says this is all too late, I am comforted by the fact that I am still 
learning new things every day. It is possible to sleep through the morning 
but still wake up for the new day.
Your friend,
Naugga Ciunerput
In this final section of the April 10 letter, we see a handful of features already 
noted. A series of philosophically-weighted questions are posed in the second-to-last 
paragraph, ironic self-deprecation arises in the letter’s final paragraph, and authority is 
again attributed to Wally when Naugga apologizes for his complaints (though the 
apology itself can be understood in layers of ironic self-deprecation or false modesty, 
suggesting that an ironic edge is probably also present in this deflection of authority).
Perhaps it is Naugga’s likability that merits mention in closing. Signing the letter 
“your friend” shows Naugga as a personable correspondent, no matter how skeptical he is 
of the subject matter raised in the letter. This closing puts words to an invitational quality 
that is unfolding through the tone of the letter as a whole: in befriending the editor to
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whom the letter is addressed Naugga is simultaneously attempting the same with his 
unknown readers, inviting agreement, consideration, and an essential form of empathy. 
But this does not serve only as a form of recruitment. The personal tone used in the letter 
precludes a purely political and economic understanding of ANCSA; it folds profoundly 
human experiences like bereavement and pride, along with psychology, identity, 
knowledge, place, and history into the issue— and thus foregoes any claim to a solution, a 
quick fix, or a key compromise. The Letters, then, are not a call to action. They are a 
call to thought, to critical and lucid reflection.
Accordingly, this thesis considers the literary elements essential to the Letters’ 
positioning as a voice of prescience and dissent regarding the outcomes of Alaska’s 
struggle over land claims. The first chapter in the body of this thesis provides a three-part 
discussion of the historical context surrounding the Letters to Howard. It emphasizes the 
nexus between social issues and resource development issues influencing the legal 
decisions made during the period of Alaska Native land claims, delineates a brief history 
of Native American newspapers, and draws from my recent correspondence with Fred 
Bigjim and James Ito-Adler, the authors of the Letters, to shed light on their artistic 
collaboration. This chapter supplies the background necessary for a socially, politically, 
and historically informed reading of the Letters.
In the second and third chapters of this thesis I turn my attention to a central 
literary feature operating in the Letters, irony. Chapter two parses the various ways in
which irony constructs a multiplicity of meanings. I draw from elements of Linda 
Hutcheon’s theory of irony, applying her ideas to textual examples of irony from the 
Letters and drawing the literary elements of character and voice into consideration as 
well. The thrust of my effort here is to reconstruct layers of significance as the act of 
tracing Hutcheon’s theory helps to locate meaning between the lines.
Chapter three develops a discursive understanding of irony in the Letters. It 
begins with a discussion of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy, then moves into a 
consideration of ironic passages in the Letters, turning again to Hutcheon’s guidance in 
illuminating these subtleties. Finally, this chapter also considers the Letters' participation 
in public discourse, examining the ways in which the Letters contest history and frame 
the nature and distribution of power.
Ultimately, the dual purpose of this thesis is to consider how literary features 
contribute to content in the Letters to Howard, as well as how these features expand the 





Angles on the Historical and Political Scene Surrounding Letters to Howard
This chapter explores the historical and political context in which Bigjim and Ito- 
Adler wrote the Letters to Howard. A history of the Alaska Native land claims appears 
below, but as historical description is not the central purpose of this thesis, my historical 
discussion is limited both in scope and depth by time and space. Nevertheless, an 
understanding of the literary features operating in the Letters—not to mention an 
understanding of their ironic subtleties— demands a basic understanding of the political 
complexities of the times. Accordingly, the national political climate, the Statehood Act, 
the discovery of oil, and the fundamentals of ANCSA (the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act) are all introduced in the opening section of this chapter. Next, I touch on 
the development of literacy among Alaska Natives and the role of published news in 
indigenous American history in order to contextualize Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s use first of 
the written word and second of the Tundra Times, two essential features of their vehicle 
of expression. This section exposes the literary importance of the Letters in the area of 
Native Alaskan writing, and provides the foundation for this thesis’ approach to the 
Letters as literature. Finally, this chapter’s third goal is to shed light on the practical 
circumstances of the letter writing itself and on the collaboration that occurred between 
Bigjim and Ito-Adler. To this end, I draw from my personal correspondence with the 
authors.
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Alaska Native Land Claims
The Civil Rights Political Climate o f  the 1960s
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 embodies the dramatic restructuring of our nation’s 
perspective on the legitimacy of marginalized peoples’ demands for social and economic 
justice. In this climate, political consciousness expanded quickly among a small group of 
mostly young Alaska Natives, all of whom were influenced by experiences they had 
outside of Alaska villages, and many of whom were college educated. The ensuing rise 
in political participation among Alaska Natives thus paralleled that of other 
disenfranchized populations throughout the country (Mitchell 12).
Yet this is not to say that Alaska Natives had been politically inactive during the 
decades leading up to the larger Civil Rights movement: far from it. Native Americans 
had received U.S. citizenship in 1924. But unlike Alaska Natives, Indians in the 
contiguous forty-eight participated very little in their states’ politics during the thirties, 
forties, and fifties, largely because they were discouraged from doing so. In Utah, for 
example, the right of reservation Indians to vote was not settled until 1956. Alaska 
Natives, on the other hand, already had a long tradition of political participation by the 
time the sixties rolled around: in Alaska, the tradition of voter participation had begun as 
early as 1916 (Mitchell 12).
Three sudden threats to Native land rights helped spark the dramatic increase in 
Native political action during the sixties. The Barrow Duck-In of 1960 was a somewhat 
comedic protest against an international migratory birds treaty that limited the hunting
season. In a show of solidarity for a hunter who was arrested for shooting a duck outside 
of season, 138 hunters shot ducks and presented themselves to Barrow’s federal game 
warden for arrest (Arnold 95). Hunting rights thus became front-page news, bolstering 
Natives’ concerns over their land rights.
Three years later, Stevens Village filed a protest against the Rampart Dam, a 
federal project designed to produce electrical power and a recreation area by flooding 
land occupied by numerous Athabascan villages. The villages of Beaver, Birch Creek, 
and Canyon Village followed suit, filing claims to the land they used for hunting, fishing, 
and trapping (Arnold 102-103).
Project Chariot, something of a freakish plan for nuclear experimentation, may 
rank highest on the list of cathartic events that sparked a sudden increase in Native 
political action in the sixties. While Natives in Alaska had recently been putting more 
and more pressure on Congress to give them a clear definition of their aboriginal rights, 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had developed plans to explode hydrogen bombs 
just a few miles from the village of Point Hope, Alaska. In his book on the history of 
Project Chariot, Dan O ’Neill writes with understated equanimity that “the idea was to 
create an instant deep water harbor at Cape Thompson in northwest Alaska by 
simultaneously detonating several thermonuclear bombs” (O’Neill 35). In 1958, the AEC 
requested that the Department of the Interior withdraw 1,600 square miles of federal land 
adjacent to the village of Point Hope from the public domain, and thus unwittingly 
confirmed what Native leaders had already come to believe: that without legally specified 
rights, the nature of their existence within the borders of a global power would remain
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precarious at best. Under these circumstances, the statewide movement known as Native 
Land Claims was born (Mitchell 15).
In fact, it was the chaos surrounding Project Chariot in his Native village of Point 
Hope that lured Inupiaq artist Howard Rock1 into the full immersion in Alaskan politics 
that marked the final fifteen odd years of his life. After playing a central role in the fight 
against Project Chariot, Rock became the editor of a newspaper founded to serve 
Alaska’s remote peoples and villages. And Rock’s work with the Tundra Times occurred 
in perfect synchronicity with a broader national pattern: the increased cultural and civil 
rights awareness that blossomed in the 1960s had ushered in a notable expansion in the 
number of indigenous American newspapers to enter circulation. Indeed, the year 1970 
saw more Native newspaper titles established than in any other year (Littlefield Jr. and 
Parins xix). It was in the midst of this last wave in Native American newspaper 
development that the Tundra Times was established in Fairbanks, Alaska: its first issue 
appeared in October, 1962.
Implications o f  the Statehood Act
Section six of the Statehood Act authorized Alaska to select and be conveyed 
legal title to over one hundred million acres of federal land in Alaska. Section four of the 
same act required the new state to “disclaim all right and title to any lands, the right or
16
1 The details of Rock’s life are chronicled in Lael Morgan’s biography of him, Art and Eskimo Power: the 
Life and Times of Alaskan Howard Rock.
title to which may be held by Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts,” declaring that such lands 
would “remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States until 
disposed of under its authority” (Mitchell 83). It was a confusing legal situation.
Virtually all of Alaska was affected by Native aboriginal title, to which the Organic Act 
of 1884 did not offer the specific protection it extended to miners and missionaries—but 
the Organic Act did recognize aboriginal title insofar as it promised continued land use 
and occupancy to those with aboriginal rights (Arnold 68). In any case, Section four of 
the Statehood Act seemed to prohibit the state from selecting the federal land that Section 
six authorized it to select.
Late in 1959, the Tlingit and Haida Indians received a favorable decision from the 
United States Court of Claims. The decision held that these Native groups had claim to 
most of Southeast Alaska via aboriginal title before the federal withdrawals. The 
decision set the stage for Natives across the state to assert similar land claims in court 
(Case and Voluck, 156). Eventually, they would mobilize to push collectively for a 
settlement.
Native organizations began pressuring the Secretary of the Interior to halt the 
state’s land selection until Alaska Natives’ aboriginal claims were settled (Mitchell 88). 
They also methodically protested the state’s oil leasing program on the grounds that the 
state’s ownership of the land was still subject to the question of aboriginal title (Mitchell 
138). In 1966, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, imposed a “land freeze.” 
The freeze effectively prevented the transferal of federal land in Alaska to the state, thus
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protecting against the possibility that Alaskan acreage would be drained away, leaving 
the Natives with a land claim but no land to select (Martin n.p.).
Understanding Oil
Although the land freeze was designed to create pressure for a settlement with 
Alaska Natives, the freeze itself never wielded as much pressure as did the North Slope 
oil discoveries (Berry 1975 and Martin n.p.). Indeed, it is oil and the money associated 
with it that provided the motivation necessary for the government to deal with its 
Natives’ land claims. It is thus critical to consider the role of fossil fuels leading up to 
and during the land claims period.
When he became president in 1953, Dwight Eisenhower ended the government 
drilling program, making lucrative oil exploration contracts more available to private 
companies. Three years later, when the Israeli-Egyptian war temporarily closed the Suez 
Canal—blocking oil tanker traffic, among other things—the managers of British 
Petroleum became convinced that they needed to find a dependable supply of oil, 
preferably located in a less politically volatile location than the middle east. British 
Petroleum thus joined ongoing efforts to explore for oil in Alaska (Mitchell 182).
In 1964, 1965, and 1967, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources held the 
first three competitive lease sales offering tracts in Prudhoe Bay. Oil was struck in April 
of 1967—the year immediately following Secretary Udall’s land freeze— and oil fever 
became the newest epidemic to hit Alaska (Mitchell 182). The find was tremendous. It 
set the scene for a new challenge: that of pipeline construction. Alaska’s two most
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important political and economic issues thus converged. As Donald Craig Mitchell 
writes in his highly detailed account of ANCSA’s passage, Take M y Land, Take M y Life,
In additon to the design and construction challenges of forging and then 
laying 800 miles of zinc-coated, four-foot-diameter steel pipe in subzero 
temperatures, first across tundra underlain by permafrost and then over the 
150-mile-wide Brooks mountain range, there was a plethora of potential 
political pitfalls.
The first and most important was that the pipeline would cross 
hundreds of miles of federal land—but as a consequence of the land 
freeze, the BLM had stopped approving applications for right-of-way 
permits... (Mitchell 183-184)
The crux of the matter, then, was that Alaska was forced to address the issue of 
aboriginal title to its land if it was to develop its world-class oil resources.
The Essentials o f  ANCSA
The version of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act that was enacted into law 
in 1971 was over 27 single-spaced pages long, comingling Indian law, public land law, 
and corporate law (Mitchell 270). Yet for all its complexity, ANCSA must be understood 
as a highly specialized piece of legislation. A close study of the federal government’s 
relationship to Alaska Natives, Alaska Natives and American Laws, points out that while
American law has historically been applied to Alaska Natives in relation to four distinct 
areas—land, human services, subsistence rights, and Native government— ANCSA only 
directly affects one of these areas, that of land (Case and Voluck 16).
While the legislation went through myriad drafts and congressional hearings, it 
retained a basic three-part structure throughout its iterations. Part one granted each 
Native village legal title to federal land within and surrounding the village. Part two 
granted each village ownership of the surface of a number of additional acres. Part three 
centered on monetary compensation for the extinguishment of their aboriginal title to the 
federal land they would not receive (Mitchell 143). In its finalized state, ANCSA required 
village and regional corporations to be conveyed legal title to forty-four million acres of 
federal land and to be paid $962.5 million, thus settling the 102-year-old land claims 
dispute (Mitchell 493).
It is notable that title to the land was to be turned over not to the villages as they 
already were, but to the villages as they would be organized in corporations (Mitchell 
156). At first, introducing the corporate model into Alaska’s dealings with Native land 
struck lawmakers as perposterous because it was so far removed from the U.S.’ previous 
patterns of addressing Indian land issues. But by the congressional hearings of 1968, 
there was such unanimity on the point of corporations that it was not even mentioned as 
an issue. More than sixty Native leaders representing every Native organization in 
Alaska either testified or submitted a statement during the February 1968 hearings, and 
none raised any objection to the requirement that Alaska Natives organize state-chartered 
business corporations (Mitchell, 163). As Mitchell puts it, “by the spring of 1971
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regional corporations were as sacrosanct a settlement term as forty million acres of land” 
(426).
Although at present it is both common as well as politically correct to critique the 
introduction of the corporate model to Native land management, this was not the case 
during the late sixties while land claims were being negotiated. Nor was it so during the 
early seventies, when Bigjim and Ito-Adler were writing the Letters to Howard. It is 
particularly notable, then, that Bigjim and Ito-Adler offered such prescient critique of 
Native corporate land management given that they were steeped in a political climate that 
featured so little comparable dissent.
The explanation that Mitchell offers in Take M y Land, Take M y Life for the 
Natives’ widespread agreement with ANCSA’s corporation stipulations centers on the 
economic trends that had been established during the previous two centuries— centuries 
during the course of which Alaska Natives had become active participants, both as 
consumers and laborers, in what Mitchell calls the “white economy” (459). The most 
culturally transformative technologies to which Alaska Natives had enthusiastically 
sought access included firearms, outboard motors, snowmachines, and finally, all-terrain 
vehicles (Mitchell 511). Mitchell explains what myriad others’ opinions, experiences, 
studies, and reports also support: that while such technologies have reduced the amount 
of physical labor necessary to support life in Native villages, these improvements have 
come at a deep psychological cost (527). Decreased self-sufficiency is at the root of this 
phenomenon.
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Nevertheless, as many of the savvier politicians in Congress understood during 
the land claims negotiations, once the issue of aboriginal rights to land ownership had 
been settled, Alaska Natives would wish to finance further and improved access to the 
dominant, material culture by developing whatever marketable natural resources occurred 
on their lands (Mitchell 460). Indeed, when ANCSA was enacted, giving Alaska Natives a 
hand in the development of the state’s economy, the Native corporate leaders began to 
pursue natural resources development activities “with an enthusiasm equal to that of the 
white business members of the Anchorage and Fairbanks Chambers of Commerce” 
(Mitchell 517). Extensive concrete documentation of this can be found, among other 
places, in Kathy Durbin’s book, Tongass: Pulp Politics, a discussion of the various actors 
involved in logging southeast Alaska. Durbin exposes the voracity, abandon, haste, and 
lawlessness with which Native corporations razed the old-growth forests on their lands— 
often to the dismay of their stockholders—in a study that exemplifies the short­
sightedness of the resource development mentality so characteristic of the profound 
human greed embodied in the for-profit corporate model.
By Mitchell’s analysis, some critical observations regarding ANCSA’s outcomes 
achieved the status of “fact” roughly a decade after its enactment, during the early 1980s: 
the first was that it became apparent that most Alaska Natives would have no 
involvement implementing ANCSA. In other words, most Natives had become 
shareholders in corporations in which they would never participate at either the 
managerial or the operational level. And most importantly according to Mitchell, by the 
eighties it had also become apparent that the legislation’s land and monetary
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compensation had “done little to alleviate the economic and social problems that are 
pandemic in Native villages” (Mitchell 504). To reiterate a critical undercurrent of this 
thesis, what is exceptional about the Letters to Howard on a political level is the precision 
with which its writers make their predictions about ANCSA’s outcomes— outcomes 
which, as Mitchell points out, were not accepted publicly until a decade had elapsed since 
the law’s enactment.
The trepidation surrounding ANCSA that is expressed in the Letters is mirrored in 
select other sources, such as Willie Hensley’s explanation to the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs why village corporations on the North Slope were doomed. 
Hensley’s warning came just two years subsequently to the publication of the Letters in 
the Tundra Times, and emphasized the suddenness and foreignness of the concepts and 
stipulations made in the legislation, as well as the scarcity of experienced managerial 
talent in the Native community (Mitchell 519-520). But far from blaming land claims era 
politicians, Mitchell emphasizes Native accountability and agency in the crafting of 
ANCSA. He writes,
ANCSA was not, as its most vocal critics ... now charge, a scheme hatched 
by a malevolent Congress to steal Native land and destroy traditional 
Native cultures by requiring Alaska Natives to organize corporations.
R a th e r . ANCSA was an unprecedented experiment in Native American 




The question of Native political involvement versus manipulation will now, 
however, be put aside in the interest of more closely approaching this thesis’ central aim: 
to shed light on a single yet salient voice of Native dissent that articulated a poignant 
critique of ANCSA almost immediately after its enactment. Because this voice found its 
platform in a Native newspaper, my effort at presenting historical context now shifts first 
to an overview of the introduction and subsequent rise of literacy among Alaska Natives, 
and then to an examination of the national phenomenon of indigenous periodicals and 
news organizations.
A Brief Overview of the Development of Literacy Among Alaska Natives
Fred Bigjim’s generation was the first to achieve a widespread, more-than- 
functional literacy. Alaska Natives were first exposed to textual communication by 
Russian missionaries in the 1820s. In his article on the history of literacy among Alaska 
Natives, William Schneider explains that the power perceived to be derived from the 
written word of God fueled and inspired some of the earliest forms of Native literacy 
(“Writing Within the Tradition” 250). During this time, the bulk of Native writing 
consisted of bible translations, but also included some manuscripts, correspondence, and 
diaries (Schneider “Writing Within the Tradition” 248).
With the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867, education in Alaskan 
villages underwent a long period of administrative transfers during which time very little 
effort was made by the U.S. government to support or invest in an Alaskan school 
system. Yet many Alaskans acquired what Schneider calls a “functional literacy,” in 
which “reading and writing were taught as necessary skills, but little encouragement was 
offered or given to approach writing as a creative activity” (“Writing Within the 
Tradition” 251). The 1960s, however, saw a florescence of writing by Alaska Natives. 
Funding was directed at developing literacy among Natives through, for example, the 
founding of the Alaska Native Language Center in 1972 and the inception of the Foxfire 
program in 1974. As Schneider explains, writing came to be seen as a tool with which to 
document and preserve traditions, an interest which was related in large part to 
developments on a broader, national scale. More specifically, the social upheaval of the 
1960s, which involved a movement toward recognizing and celebrating cultural diversity, 
likely played a role in spurring the use of writing and publishing among Alaska Natives.
As these textual forms of communication spread into Native circles, literacy rose 
to the fore of modern anthropological interest in Alaska’s indigenous peoples. Phyllis 
Morrow, for example, considers authoring as a culturally-specific tradition. Here, she 
questions its cross-cultural translatability: “authoring itself is, and even exists in, a 
peculiarly Western cultural milieu. Is it then possible for a Native a u th o r . to create— or 
represent— a discourse that departs from the conventions and cultural implications of 
authoring?” (Morrow 31). Morrow’s concern here is that the medium of discourse 
itself—in this case, writing—may be thoroughly bound up in that discourse’s
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assumptions, values, judgments, and general rules of the game. If this is understood as 
the case, then the medium itself places insuperable constraints on the discourse that can 
occur within it. A speculative question that I would like to raise in turn, is this: to what 
extent is it possible for a voice to be heard in a cross-cultural (yet dominantly western) 
public discourse without use of the written word? The dominant metric of authority and 
importance is, after all, built on evaluating written sources, not oral ones. Is participation 
contingent on a degree of cooperation with this convention?
While the question I have posed here falls beyond the scope of this chapter and of 
this thesis in general, I raise it in part out of respect for Fred Bigjim’s decision to 
participate textually via the Letters to Howard. Despite its deep-seated cultural 
implications, writing may, despite Morrow’s concerns, be understood as a tool that 
Alaska Natives have adapted to their own needs; in the way that Angela Sydney insists 
that English is a Native language (Cruikshank, Life Lived Like a Story 16-17), perhaps in 
a certain light it is reasonable to understand writing and authoring as a (new) Native 
cultural practice as well.
The Role of Published News in Native Alaskan History
The basic premise of Daniel Littlefield, Jr. and James W. Parins’ guide to 
American Indian and Alaska Native newspapers is that the historical period of 1925-1970 
was one of many rapid, notable changes in the development of Native peoples’
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periodicals. While the development of a recognizably Native press did not truly occur 
until the 1970s, the groundwork for that development occurred in the decades leading up 
to it (Littlefield Jr. and Parins xi). Old policies and attitudes of missionization and 
assimilation dominated Native American periodicals in the 1920s and ‘30s, but a strong 
movement in the counterculture had begun to oppose such views, arguing instead for 
rights in areas such as self-government, religion, and civil liberties. Foremost among 
these was the American Indian Defense Association’s publication, American Indian Life, 
which was known for its attacks on the policies of the Office of Indian Affairs (Littlefield 
Jr. and Parins xii).
By the end of World War II, the political mood had shifted decisively toward 
severing federal involvement in Native American affairs. The need for a coordinated, 
informed effort to meet the challenges that this political mood posed—both to individual 
tribes as well as to Native Americans collectively—thus gained momentum in the late 
1940s. The news publications that resulted can be attributed in part to this post-war 
political climate, but they are also attributable to the increasing urbanization of the Native 
American population. Mid-century urbanization brought together people from widely 
diverse backgrounds and fostered a fruitful exchange of ideas about common issues 
(Littlefield Jr. and Parins xv).
Soon thereafter, the increased cultural and civil rights awareness that blossomed 
in the 1960s tipped the scales. The American Indian centers developed during this time 
became the primary sponsors and distributors of urban Indian newsletters, including, just 
to name a few, Seattle’s Indian Center News and Denver’s Indian Times in 1960, San
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Francisco’s Indian Center in 1964, and Milwaukee’s Smog Signals in 1969 (Littlefield Jr. 
and Parins xvii). It was in 1962, during the early building of this wave, that the Tundra 
Times was established in Fairbanks. It was accompanied by Native News in the same 
year, The Trail Blazer in 1966, and Arctic Village Echoes in 1969. This period of rapid 
indigenous news expansion culminated in 1970, the year that saw more Native newspaper 
titles established than in any other year, including additional Alaska Native publications 
such as Alaska Federation o f  Natives and Sitka ANB News (Littlefield Jr. and Parins xix- 
xx). The Tundra Times continued to expand in the 1970s, but led a shakier existence 
after the death of its beloved editor, Howard Rock. Yet even throughout its decline in the 
1980s, the Tundra Times was agreed to be the strongest independent Native voice in 
Alaska (Littlefield Jr. and Parins 426-427).
Much of this came from the momentum of Howard Rock and his motley, yet 
utterly devoted, newspaper staff. Philanthropist Henry Forbes agreed to fund the Tundra 
Times briefly until it became financially stable (Mitchell 34), but ultimately, he would 
end up underwriting the paper until his death six years later (Morgan 221). Rock, with 
the full-time help of his friend-become-colleague Tom Snapp, a reporter for the 
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, scrambled to learn the ropes, launch the paper, and then 
keep it in print throughout subsequent years (Mitchell 32).
When he found his calling as a newsman, Howard Rock’s life had already 
spanned a great cultural spectrum. He was born in the high arctic and raised in a harsh 
hunting society. Rock later left Alaska to live a highly cosmopolitan lifestyle, much of it 
as a commercial artist, for nearly fifty years. When he returned to Alaska in 1961, Rock
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found his home village of Point Hope threatened by the experimental plans of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. Lael Morgan notes in her biography of Rock that when he 
discovered the nuclear threat his village was facing, “he moved to defend his people and 
their heritage with extraordinary decisiveness and skill” (Morgan ix). Rock would then 
spend the rest of his life immersed in Alaskan politics as he became consumed with 
running the under-financed Tundra Times and keeping close tabs on Alaskan politics and 
other Native issues.
Howard Rock explained the newspaper’s purpose in an editorial that appeared in 
its first publication:
Long before today there has been a great need for a newspaper for the 
northern Natives of Alaska. Since civilization has swept into their lives in 
tide-like earnestness, it has left the Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts in a 
bewildering state of indecision and insecurity between the seeming need 
for assimilation and... the desire to retain some of their culture and 
traditional way of life. (Tundra Times, October 14, 1962, also quoted in 
Littlefield Jr. and Parins 426)
The central communicative purpose of the Tundra Times was tri-fold. It was to 
provide a medium through which Native organizations could air their views, it was to 
keep Natives throughout the state informed on shared matters of interest, and it was to 
publish articles on Arctic culture. The content of the Tundra Times reflects all three of its
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original purposes. Of particular interest to us here is a recurrent theme relevant to each of 
these—the clash of cultures. Readers were constantly reminded that “if they adopt the 
new, they necessarily lose some of the old” (Littlefield Jr. and Parins 426).
Political Critics: Fred Bigjim and James Ito-Adler’s Literary Collaboration
When ANCSA was passed in 1971, Rock hailed it in the Tundra Times as “the 
beginning of a great era for the Native people of Alaska” (Tundra Times, December 17, 
1971), but expressed certain reservations immediately. While he applauded Native 
people for navigating the complexities of land claims, Rock warned that the tasks set 
forth in the legislation would test the strength of Native leadership (Morgan 222).
Howard Rock’s similarly-minded Inupiaq friend, Fred Seagayuk Bigjim, was a 
student enrolled in the Harvard Graduate School of Education at this time. Rock and 
Bigjim had shared a good deal of time together in downtown Fairbanks at Tommy’s 
Elbow Room (Bigjim, personal communication from September 16, 2011), and now that 
Bigjim was living in Cambridge, the pair’s focus turned to their shared concern regarding 
various misconceptions surrounding ANCSA. Bigjim hatched an idea for contributing to 
the Tundra Times. Then he asked his classmate James Ito-Adler, a graduate student in 
anthropology minoring in law, to help interpret ANCSA’s legal jargon (Ito-Adler, personal 
communication from May 4, 2011).
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The collaboration that eventually ensued resulted in the collection of letters to the 
editor central to this thesis, the Letters to Howard, in which Bigjim and Ito-Adler assume 
the names and characters of the semi-fictional Naugga Ciunerput and Wally Morton, 
residents of the fully-fictional Land’s End Village, Alaska. As Ito-Adler describes the 
overall project, “we were gently mocking essentially decent people who might be brought 
to their better senses” (personal communication, August 14, 2011). This is embodied in 
the relationship between the two characters. In the Letters, Wally is “brought along by 
Naugga Ciunerput with some gentle Eskimo pedagogy” (Ito-Adler, personal 
communication, August 14, 2011).
“This was 100% Fred’s idea and project,” explains Ito-Adler, who had returned to 
anthropology after spending two years in the Peace Corps, an experience for which he 
had abandoned his previous studies at Harvard Law School. Ito-Adler emphasizes that 
Bigjim “supplied the main energy and vision” (personal communication, May 4, 2011) 
for the Letters to Howard, explaining, “I am adamant that [Fred] receive full credit for 
the inspiration of doing the project and the deep knowledge of Native ways and thinking” 
(personal communication, May 5, 2011).
In Ito-Adler’s memory, the collaboration was a natural one, and he calls the 
partnership “complementary serendipity” (personal communication, May 4, 2011). “I 
don’t remember a single moment of contention or disagreement between us,” he writes. 
The pair thus agreed to meet once a week to draft a letter in the William James Hall 
Cafeteria over coffee and donuts. “We would simply meet, go over some section of the 
legislation that interested us, or Fred would bring in some news . and we would have at
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it” (Ito-Adler, personal communication, May 5, 2011). Ito-Adler further explains his 
comfort with the project in terms of Bigjim’s fundamental goodwill: “one of the reasons I 
went along with this was my confidence in Fred and sense of his transparent motivation” 
(personal communication, May 4, 2011).
While the inception of the Tundra Times occurred in tandem with the nation-wide 
flourishing of Native periodicals and newspapers, Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s letters to the 
editor—hinging on a mixture of fictionalized elements and poignant political 
commentary—were written seventy years after their most similar predecessor, Alexander 
Posey’s Fus Fixico letters, had appeared. The Fus Fixico letters, originally published in a 
Creek Nation newspaper beginning in 1902, were a literary reaction to the dramatic 
transformation of the Indian nations of Indian Territory. They mixed a rustic dialect with 
sly humor, the content of which centered largely on the nexus between the literary tool of 
characterization and the sociopolitical issue of the shift in land tenure that was then 
dismantling notions of common ownership in favor of privatization. Much of the humor 
in the Fus Fixico letters derives from the perspectives of the characters whose views are 
somewhat aloof and disjointed, distancing them from the events hurtling the Creeks 
toward a new political order. The letters’ characters are “amazed, amused, puzzled” 
(Littlefield, Jr. and Hunter 37) by the greed, materialism, political ambition, dishonesty, 
and hypocrisy of the whites—yet they recognize the complicity of Indians, even 
themselves, in the process. They are humorously split: proponents of prohibition who 
drink whenever they can get it, and mocking Indians who take on white ways, yet 
imagining themselves smoking fancy cigars and walking on plush carpets. For his
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authorship of the Fus Fixico letters, Native news scholar Daniel Littlefield considers 
Alexander Posey one of the best Indian humorists of all time (Littlefield, Jr. and Hunter 
47).
Despite the strong parallels in method or template between Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s 
1973 letters and Alexander Posey’s from the turn of the century, the Harvard pair was not 
familiar with the Fus Fixico letters (Bigjim, personal communication, September 16, 
2011). “For me,” writes Ito-Adler, “there were no conscious models that we were 
following” (Ito-Adler, personal communication, May 12, 2011).
Ito-Adler explains that the style which took shape in the Letters to Howard 
evolved quickly as he and Bigjim invented and fleshed out the characters. “To the extent 
that Naugga rang true as an old Eskimo man, it came from Fred and I suppose I absorbed 
his spirit when I drafted anything in Naugga’s voice,” writes Ito-Adler. And “Wally was 
easy.. .teaching at Harvard we were surrounded by Wallys— good intentions, somewhat 
naive, but willing to learn, just the kind of people I knew in the Peace Corps as well” (Ito- 
Adler, personal communication, May 12, 2011). The heartfelt, idiosyncratic voices of the 
characters in the Letters to Howard, like that of those in the Fus Fixico letters, are key: 
characterization and voice are a poignant part of what makes each set of letters articulate 
as well as socially and politically astute.
When I asked Ito-Adler about influences more immediate than Alexander Posey, 
that is, the influences both at Harvard and more broadly in the U.S. that were affecting his 
work with Bigjim on the Letters to Howard, he cited Sandy Davis’ course, “Native 
Americans in the Contemporary United States,” a social sciences class in which both Ito-
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Adler and Bigjim served as teaching fellows. “This was a fabulous c o u r s e .” writes Ito- 
Adler. “Sandy Davis was very radical in his commitment to indigenous peoples” (Ito- 
Adler, personal communication, May 5, 2011), an orientation which fell in direct 
alignment with Ito-Adler’s.
Second to the mentorship and inspiration provided by Sandy Davis, Ito-Adler also 
mentions the role of the broader social and academic context in which he and Bigjim 
wrote the Letters:
the seventies brought all the student radical movements into graduate 
school. .M arx ism  and dependency th eo ry .w ere  strongly represented as 
well as powerful opposition from the senior faculty. . T h e  bottom line is 
that being an activist in some form or other was definitely part of the 
environment but neither Fred nor I by temperament or conviction were as 
radical as many of our peers. But we were committed to some form of 
action/activism. Our collaboration was a meeting of the minds and spirits 
in this regard. (Ito-Adler, personal communication, May 5, 2011)
The pair thus focused their attention on the task at hand, to draft letters to the 
editor with an ultimately informative and thought-provoking effect. In their introduction 
to the collected Letters, Bigjim and Ito-Adler write, “the letters are a very honest attempt 
to put down on paper certain questions, problems, feelings, and thoughts that we had 
about the situation of Native people in Alaska today” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 5). Ito-Adler
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explains further that “this would have been our greatest reward in the short-term: having 
people react to, discuss, think about, and question what was happening” (personal 




Assemblies of Meaning: The Semantics of Irony
Irony, a literary tool which Bigjim and Ito-Adler wield throughout the Letters to 
Howard, is the central concern of this chapter. Irony is one of the primary modes in 
which the Letters’ meaning takes shape between the lines, and so will be considered here 
largely in light of its complexity and the resulting layers of meaning that take up 
residence in the text.
My own reflections on the Letters are deeply indebted to the discussion and 
insight in Linda Hutcheon’s book, Irony’s Edge. Hutcheon’s central premise is that “the 
existence of one signifier— ‘irony’— should never blind us to the plurality of its functions 
as well as effects” (Hutcheon 44). In other words, irony is a dynamic literary device; it 
extends over a wide range of “tones, intentions, and effects” (Hutcheon 44). Indeed, I 
have found the ruminations in her book to be helpful in parsing both the roles and the 
layers of irony present in the Letters to Howard.
Rather than conceiving of irony as a blunt rhetorical tool, Hutcheon holds the 
position that irony creates layers of meaning in an essentially communicative process. 
While it is the task of chapter three to unpack the specifically communicative nature of 
meaning-making in irony, the chapter at hand closely considers the meaning-making 
itself, discussing the semantic characteristics of irony largely in terms of its provisional, 
self-deprecatory, and corrective functions (each of which will be further addressed
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below). At the forefront of my analysis is the basic assumption that Hutcheon is correct 
in asserting that “the power o f  the unsaid to challenge the said is the defining semantic 
condition o f  irony’ (Hutcheon 59, my emphasis). This chapter as well as the final one 
thus draws heavily from Hutcheon’s work, which forms the bulk of the theoretical lattice 
in the remainder of my thesis.
Markers and Method: Considering the Recognition and Attribution of Irony
A question that seems to have divided theorists of irony to no end is that of 
attribution. In short, how does one recognize irony? Is it something the ironist stashes in 
a text or an utterance, like a prize or a trap? Is it something the audience ascribes to a 
text or an utterance, something birthed and encompassed in that singular experiential act 
of interpretation? While questions of attribution and recognition are not ones on which I 
choose to linger with respect to the Letters to Howard, a brief consideration of this 
particular debate will help to define the scope and limitations of my approach to 
discussing irony in the Letters.
Wayne Booth’s seminal discussion of ironic markers—that is, the various clues 
which lead to the reconstruction of ironic meaning—includes five basic categories. As 
Hutcheon explains in Irony’s Edge (151), the forms of markers that Booth outlines 
consist of (1) straightforward hints delivered in the authorial voice; (2) deliberate denial 
of shared knowledge, or obvious falsification; (3) contradictions internal to the work; (4) 
stylistic clashes; and (5) conflict between the audience’s belief and that which we 
attribute to the author. The list’s strength is its scope: it allows for any combination of
text (or utterance), circumstance (surrounding context), and discourse (the intertextual) to 
be drawn in to a given scheme of the markers flagging a work’s irony.
Booth’s list leads Hutcheon to the question, “are textual or contextual markers 
meant to signal the presence of irony, the intent to be ironic, or maybe simply the 
possibility that the utterance might be interpreted as ironic?” (Hutcheon 150, emphasis in 
original). I largely bypass this question in my own work, and judge the overlap between 
presence, intent, and interpretation as too murky to warrant careful distinction. However, 
I wish to acknowledge this position largely in the interest of full disclosure and 
transparency regarding my own methodology, informal as it is.
Overall, Hutcheon identifies three theories regarding the marking, or signaling 
and identifying, of irony. “Intentionalist” theories of irony claim that the ironist leaves 
guiding clues for her interpreter. “Pragmatic” theories argue that something has to trigger 
the interpreter’s search for meaning beyond the said. “Formalist” theories claim more 
specifically that markers of irony are textual (Hutcheon 149). It is particularly the 
formalist perspective that is most closely aligned with my approach to the Letters to 
Howard, although pragmatic elements are also folded in to my approach. That is, I 
discuss irony as it manifests “on the page,” or as it takes shape textually. But where my 
methodology is also in part aligned with pragmatic theories, a basic understanding of the 
social, political, and cultural context also informs my interpretations of irony in the 
Letters to Howard. Finally, I suppose I mostly disregard intentionalist theories of irony, 
taking questions of authorial intent—that is, the issue of the author’s deliberate placement 
of clues meant to guide her interpreter— as moot.
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In other words, ironic meaning in the Letters to Howard, as I have reconstructed it 
in the pages to follow, is due almost exclusively to my orientation toward what Booth 
identifies as the second and third categories of ironic markers: the deliberate falsification 
of shared knowledge, and contradictions internal to the work.
Booth explains these areas further. “Factual discord” contained in a passage 
(Booth 61) may arise in areas such as popular expressions, historical facts, and 
conventional judgment. As Booth explains, when an interpreter discovers a breach of 
shared knowledge in any one of these areas, and thus interprets the passage as ironic, the 
irony resides in the interpreter’s guess, assumption, or understanding that the author of 
the passage does not share her speaker’s ignorance or misunderstanding.
But often this factual discord can be identified within a passage without any 
recourse to shared knowledge, that is, without departing from the content of the text. In 
this case, the ironic marker is known as “conflicts of fact within the work” (Booth 61). 
When a writer reveals a fact and then contradicts it, Booth claims the interpreter has only 
two possibilities: “either the author has been careless or he has presented us with an 
inescapable ironic invitation” (61). The essential structure of this form of irony is as 
follows: “(a) a plausible but false voice is presented; (b) contradictions of this voice are 
introduced; (c) a correct voice is finally heard, repudiating all or most or some of what 
the ostensible speaker has said” (Booth 62). Such internal contradictions serve as flags to 
savvy interpreters, who then must navigate the irony to identify which voice is, in fact 
“correct.”
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This description implies a certain stability of meaning, however, which Booth 
sees as “fixed, in the sense that once a reconstruction of meaning can be made, the reader 
is not then invited to undermine it with further demolitions and reconstructions” (6). This 
notion marks a critical divergence between Booth’s theories, influential as they are, and 
Hutcheon’s description of the ways in which ironies can and do operate. Considering the 
discursive, or dialogic element of irony, Hutcheon declares that “it is almost a miracle 
that irony is ever understood as an ironist might intend it to be: all ironies, in fact, are 
probably unstable ironies” (Hutcheon 195). The following chapter will take up dialogism 
and Hutcheon’s notions of the discursive communities that make irony (and deciphering 
it) possible. But for now, it suffices to say that Booth’s inventory of ironic markers is 
useful in demarcating the modes of factual discord on which this analysis of irony in the 
Letters to Howard is fastened. However, I hesitate to follow through with Booth’s more 
formal definitions of ironic structures of meaning—that is, I am not sure that his map of 
the “correct” voice which emerges in ironic factual discord is as helpful in understanding 
the dimensions of irony in the Letters as is Hutcheon’s perspective on ironic meaning as 
perpetually unstable, or, as will be discussed later, essentially plural.
Understanding Irony’s Edge in Letters to Howard
For Hutcheon, irony happens when the said and the “plural unsaid” rub against 
one another with a “critical edge” (Hutcheon 19). But the said and the unsaid 
constituting ironic meaning is not to be understood simply as ambiguity. Hutcheon 
writes that “ambiguity and irony are not the same thing: irony has an edge” (Hutcheon
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33). This notion of the edge figures prominently in Hutcheon’s understanding of irony; 
she insists somewhat metronomically that “irony has an edge... irony can put people on 
edge... irony is decidedly edgy” (Hutcheon 37). Part of my project in this chapter is thus 
to tease apart the meaning in Hutcheon’s notion of the edge. This effort runs parallel to 
this chapter’s central purpose: to explore the role of the ironic edge in the Letters to 
Howard.
For Hutcheon, irony’s edge hinges on the notion of plural functions. That is, the 
meaning lodged in ironic statements involves a perpetual “cutting both ways.” Consider 
the introductory sentence of the first letter to Howard: “Dear Howard: I have been living 
in this village for many years all alone except for Mr. Wally Morton, who was an old 
VISTA volunteer who got lost up here in 1970 and never got evacuated” (Bigjim and Ito- 
Adler 11). I identify this statement as ironic because it involves, as Booth has designated 
it, a falsification of shared knowledge: VISTA does not typically lose its volunteers in the 
bush and simply abandon them there, so we must be in the realm of irony. There are also 
in-text ironies at play, here: the terms “evacuated” and “lost” are ironic overstatements. 
First, VISTA volunteers do not get evacuated from their assignments. There is an absurd 
sense of disaster implied by the notion of evacuation. Second, Wally is not really lost; he 
is in Land’s End Village, Alaska. Irony exists both in the vocabulary of the passage as 
well as outside it, in relation to readers’ common knowledge.
Where, then, is the statement’s edge? Where does its meaning cut? On one hand 
the statement’s emphasis is on Wally’s background—perhaps his presence in the village 
is haphazard at best; it seems to be the product of confusion, or of crossed lines of
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communication. But the statement can also be read as simply inaccurate: its irony may 
be in its falsity. Either way, we find a split in the mood resulting from the statement: 
there is something of a dopey atmosphere surrounding Wally’s circumstances. But on the 
other hand, the implications are also somewhat darker. VISTA, known generally as a 
well-intentioned service organization, is here pegged with a certain incompetancy. Its 
(invented) disregard for its own volunteers suggests that the communities it purports to 
serve and support are also likely of little importance. The ironic edge cutting two ways 
thus functions as follows: slyly folded into the dopey accidental nature of Wally’s present 
situation is a harsh skepticism of institutionalized “help” and charitable endeavor. The 
statement contains both a cartoonish depiction of Wally’s character as well as undertones 
of a highly complex mistrust regarding urban/village and white/Native dynamics.
Furthermore, ironic play has quietly taken up its place in the very names of the 
two characters we meet in this first letter. As Ito-Adler explains to me, “Wally Morton” 
is named for Wally Hickel and Rogers Morton, “the two Secretaries of the Interior who 
were featured so prominently in AN ACT” (personal communication, May 4, 2011), and 
“Naugga Ciunerput” is Inupiaq for “our destiny” (the translation of which was confirmed 
by Bigjim, personal communication, September 16, 2011). Wally’s name has its roots in 
the figures so problematically given control over things such as determining what Native 
means and who qualifies. Yet, as noted above, the strong leadership is not exactly central 
to Wally’s character traits. Wally’s dopiness can thus be read as an ongoing critique 
leveled directly at the Secretary himself, continually calling into question the Secretary’s 
competence in handling the tasks defined by the new legislation. In contrast, Naugga
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Ciunerput, “our destiny,” becomes the clarion call of the future. His name endows him 
with the power of something much akin to an oracle. But, like classical oracles,
Naugga’s identity as such is not immediately apparent: while his insight is unfailingly 
sharp, over the course of the Letters he will prove to be nothing if not self-deprecating, - 
effacing, and -minimalizing, but in the decades following ANCSA’s enactment, concerns 
expressed by Naugga in 1973 will have become common currency in Alaskan politics. 
Ironically, Naugga practices a degree of self-effacement throughout his letters, yet 
consistently signs the Inupiaq words for “our destiny” at the bottom.
We do not have to look far to find that a flair of the tricksteresque is evident in 
Naugga’s irony. Throughout many indigenous cultures, the trickster is both a “benefactor 
and a buffoon” (Radin 124) and is responsible for the physical and social realities of the 
present. Arthur Koestler’s notion of “bisociation” is frequently cited in scholars’ efforts 
to expand views of the trickster figure from an actual character to an impulse or an 
underlying, unifying structure. Arnold Krupat explains that in bisociation, we see a 
situation in two incompatible ways. Bisociative thought thus engages the binary mind 
which hops boundaries between disparate fragments (Krupat 51-52), creating the 
provocative mental doubling or overlap which Larry Ellis dubs, “the trickster space”
(Ellis n.p.). In an interview with Joshua Nelson, Native American writer Sherman Alexie 
explains how that mental doubling operates via irony: for Alexie, irony, as a nexus of 
contradictory and plural meanings, gathers the big picture together. Irony thus 
complicates public discourse, which suffers from a fixation on the soundbite (Nelson 43). 
Irony’s essential trick, then, is its sneaky infusion of plurality into constrained spaces.
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Hutcheon identifies a nine-part continuum of the functions irony serves. I have 
selected three functions in particular as those which best describe the ironies present in 
the Letters to Howard: the provisional, the self-deprecating, and the corrective. While I 
have already mentioned Naugga’s self-deprecation in passing, the opening letter’s 
statement discussed above probably falls into the first of these categories, the provisional. 
For Hutcheon, irony always contains “a kind of built-in conditional stipulation that 
undermines any firm and fixed stand” (Hutcheon 51). This is the seat of the tension 
between irony’s said (overtly stated) meaning, and its unsaid (the amalgam of possible 
unstated) meanings. As Hutcheon puts it, irony has a “fence-sitting provisionality” 
(Hutcheon 51), that is, one in which the ironist can address remarks to a recipient who 
will comprehend those remarks, be known to comprehend them, know that she is known 
to comprehend them—yet neither party will be able to hold the other responsible for what 
has been communicated (Hutcheon cites Goffman 1974 for this idea).
When Bigjim and Ito-Adler write (in Naugga’s voice), “Dear Howard: I have 
been living in this village for many years all alone except for Mr. Wally Morton, who 
was an old VISTA volunteer who got lost up here in 1970 and never got evacuated”— and 
when a reader deciphers that undercurrent of meaning that covertly hints at a tension 
between.. .is it service organizations and those they serve? Or is it a tension between the 
city and the village? Or more broadly, between whites and Natives—the colonial 
presence and the indigenous? As we find we cannot pinpoint the ironic edge’s precise 
implication, it becomes impossible to hold the statement directly accountable for this 
particular realm of its meaning. Yet this is not the product of confusion of
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miscommunication. It is the nature of provisional irony: irony which includes, among the 
clarity of its plural meanings, a persistent evasion. Provisional irony imparts meanings 
without necessarily owning up to all of them. Attention to the unsaid in ironic statements 
reveals a provisional dimension in virtually all of the ironies used throughout the Letters.
The next example of irony in the Letters is not strictly textual—that is, among its 
most overt meanings, this passage points out an irony of the political situation that Bigjim 
and Ito-Adler criticize. But a closer look also reveals ironic play on the level of 
character: Naugga dodges authority while simultaneously voicing a bold position. Ironic 
contradiction thus takes shape in two modes. Closer to the surface it appears in terms of 
subject and content (on the plane of politics), and beneath this level irony resides in the 
passage’s voice as veiled self-deprecation.
Wally has been telling me for so long how important it is for us traditional 
Natives to learn how to use the modern legal political system. This is so 
we will be able to operate in the dominant White society, as he puts it.
Now it says in AN ACT that Natives cannot use any of this money to 
influence the political system. I asked Wally if White corporations can 
use their money to influence politics and he admitted that oil companies, 
for example, maintain big lo b b ie s . (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 21)
This passage is an instance of reported speech. In it, Wally’s words and 
explanations are reported by Naugga. Then the latter’s words are, in turn, printed and
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carried in the Tundra Times. Meaning and the conveying of it thus depends on this chain 
of reports. Each link in the chain either lends its own interpretation or cachet of 
presentation to the meaning and the act of communication. This instance of reported 
speech is one example of many; letters dated March 30, April 17, May 15, and July 15 
also illustrate such a deflection of authority . But Naugga’s reliance on Wally’s 
knowledge and explanations also works toward setting up a hierarchy between the two 
characters. Implicit in his constant reporting of Wally’s speech and reliance on Wally’s 
point of view is the sense that Naugga is consistently looking up to Wally.
First, consider the ironic content of the passage. What flags the content as an 
ironic portrayal of the political system? It underscores a contradiction within the system 
itself—a system that both demands, yet simultaneously blocks, Native participation in the 
corporate political order—a contradiction which, to paraphrase Booth, gives us the option 
of brushing it off as a careless mistake, or interpreting it as ironic.
The heart of the irony, as I interpret it, is in the general simplicity and neutrality 
of the vocabulary. Wally has not been demanding, commanding, or insisting, he has been 
“telling me ... how important.” And Wally’s position is not couched in the severity of 
survival, it is about being “able to operate.” The language has a calmness to it, stripping 
the passage of the melodrama or theatrics expected in association with statements of 
political protest. Naugga’s voice is gentle. He brings his meaning into focus by 
understating it.
2 In the latter two examples, Naugga defers not only Wally’s knowledge but also to that of Joe Ayagtug, a 
character who makes a brief appearance in the Letters.
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The passage’s meaning thus cuts into the absurdity of the system, but it also 
makes a sociocultural comment via attitude. Outrage in the face of injustice is (perhaps 
paradoxically) widely accepted as reasonable: we see it anywhere from children’s 
tantrums in the aisles of grocery stores to politicians raving over healthcare decisions 
during congressional hearings. Over-the-top displays of emotion and heavily dramatized 
rhetoric seem to go hand in hand with the ever-increasingly graphic nature of both news 
and entertainment media. Next to the culture of often flamboyantly emotive expression, 
Naugga’s even-keeled wording takes on a dimension of meaning all to itself. Here we 
see some of the “gentle Eskimo pedagogy” Ito-Adler mentioned (see preceeding chapter). 
Naugga calmly raises his objection to the unfairness of the system which will not allow 
Native corporations to function fully as corporations— a system which is requiring 
corporate participation in the first place— and while it is not fair that Natives are blocked 
from full corporate participation in politics, Naugga himself opts out of full emotional 
participation in injustice. He does not meet the system’s severity on its terms, rather 
maintaining a detached levelheadedness. Political power is said to reside on the side of 
“the dominant White society” but Naugga’s expressive calm simultaneously undermines 
his own portrayal of the distribution of power, implicitly complicating the view that 
dominant society defines and monopolizes the framework. Voice and language thus 
move the passage beyond the absurdity of contradiction in politics into the realm of the 
ironic edge.
Here it is useful to distinguish between voice and authorial stance. The voice is 
that of an old Native man reporting a white VISTA volunteer’s words. Yet the authorial
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stance involves two graduate students collaborating on a critique, with the Native student 
providing the initial impetus, motivation, and lead on the project. The authorial stance, 
largely collaborative, contrasts with the sense of status and hierarchy conveyed through 
Naugga’s voice, his use of reported speech, and the resulting power dynamic taking 
shape between the Letters' characters.
We can sharpen our focus on the power of Naugga’s voice by turning our 
attention to self-deprecatory techniques. I notice that ironic self-deprecation in the 
Letters is associated with contradictions internal to the text: that is, in Naugga we 
encounter a sharp, critical thinker who persists in using diminutive terms like “just” when 
referring to himself, saying that he is, for instance, “just an old man from a small village” 
(Bigjim and Ito-Adler 22— examples abound nearly every page). Diminutive 
terminology is the most explicit form of self-deprecation present in the Letters, but two 
other recurrent stylistic elements have self-deprecating implications as well: (1) 
questioning, and (2) the deflection of authority.
The first of these, questioning, occurs in nearly every letter. For example, 
regarding the lobbying limitations imposed on Native corporations Naugga writes, “if this 
is supposed to be a fa ir  and ju s t settlement of the Alaska Native Claims why is our use of 
the money restricted by AN ACT?” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 21, emphasis in original). The 
question is clearly rhetorical, standing in for the direct statement that restrictions on 
Native corporations’ use of money is unfair and unjust. In a later letter which also 
questions the significance of fairness and justice, Naugga discusses the creation of parks, 
refuges, and sanctuaries. He asks, “how then can this be a ‘fair and just’ settlement if  that
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land was taken from us without our knowledge and is not going to be included in the 
selection process? What will become of the villages in these areas? Who is this wildlife 
being reserved for?” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 30). While I am not inclined to read 
Naugga’s questions as individually self-deprecating, their frequency has a net effect 
beyond that of any particular example. In other words, Naugga’s style, which is heavily 
reliant upon questioning, is non-combative. He often opts for a question over a direct 
statement of opinion, and frequently softens his direct statements by interspersing them 
with questions, ultimately allowing him to stake out a very clear, unpopular stand without 
coming across as belligerent or inflated with superiority. By asking questions, Naugga 
remains approachable. And approachability, in the fiery, volatile context of Alaska’s 
land claims era, may well be taken as a close cousin of self-deprecation.
In tandem with Naugga’s diminutive language and question-posing, I next 
consider the deflection of authority. This which often takes the form of an informal 
citation, or a gesture of deference to outside knowledge (most often Wally’s). This can 
be seen in one of the later letters that recalls the Secretary of the Interior’s power as the 
final arbiter in questions of who does and does not qualify as Native. Naugga writes, 
“Wally says that an agreement with all of the discretionary power on one side is a pretty 
one-sided agreement” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 88). Here, it is opinion that is 
communicated by Naugga—but through Wally’s presumed authority. And in the 
following example, Naugga draws on factual information which he cites informally, 
rather than declaring it as his own, or even as public, knowledge: “Wally says that the
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Federal Government terminated the Menominee tribe in Wisconsin by bargaining with 
them over a claims settlement that they had been awarded” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 92).
Naugga’s persistent deflection of authority recalls norms of indirect address 
commonly found among traditional indigenous Alaskan groups. While indirect address is 
not self-deprecatory in the least, the formula “Wally says” operates as a form of self­
deprecation in part because Wally is the last one to whom authority probably should be 
ascribed, at least in any earnest way. As we have seen from the Letters’ opening, Wally 
does not seem to be stunningly competent or an expert in anything in particular—he is an 
ex-VISTA volunteer so we can infer that he has a certain zeal for participating in positive 
change, but given that he is stranded in Land’s End Village and given up as lost, we must 
assume that Wally does more drifting through life than actively controlling it. Deferring 
both factual claims as well as positional or value-based claims is a mildly self- 
deprecating act in the first place, but deferring these claims to mild-mannered Wally’s 
authority signals a particularly deep humbleness on Naugga’s part. The implications of 
reading such a humbleness as ironic will be considered shortly.
Hutcheon treats self-deprecation as a form of irony whose function is ultimately 
defensive or protective. She discusses ironic uses of self-deprecation in terms of its 
Canadian use in the face of a historic French and British colonialism and a U.S.- 
dominated present, but her inventory of implications is intentionally broad enough to be 
useful in considering other examples—like those in the Letters to Howard—as well:
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Canadians have often resorted to a self-deprecating use of irony as a way 
of signaling their reluctant modesty, their self-positioning (as marginalized 
and maybe self-marginalizing), their self-doubts, and perhaps even their 
rejection of the need to presume or to assume superiority— especially 
against such overwhelming odds. .. .self-deprecation can be feigned 
[Hutcheon cites Knox 1989]; it can be a form of indirect self-promotion ... 
a deliberate attempt to render oneself invulnerable. So, self-deprecation 
can be read as a defensive move, as well. (Hutcheon 50)
In the Letters, I read Naugga’s self-deprecation neither as much of a tool of 
defense nor as a form of indirect self-promotion. Instead, I read it as containing various 
shades of what Hutcheon calls “self-positioning” embedded in a deep cultural and trans- 
cultural awareness. The self-deprecatory techniques I have identified in the Letters— 
diminutive language, questioning, and the deflection of authority—play on the 
marginalized nature of Native villagers’ political voices. On one level, Naugga’s self­
deprecation is both an acknowledgment and a refusal: by downplaying his own 
importance he first acknowledges his voice as a marginalized one, that is, as one that 
does not hold any notable political sway. But on a second level, Naugga is 
simultaneously refusing to pose as more powerful or authoritatively influential than he is. 
In other words, he does not pretend to have any particular degree of political sway, 
choosing instead to emphasize the opposite. That is, Naugga is neither pursuing power 
nor even the semblance or cachet of power (that is, as it typically manifests)—his use of
self-deprecation is thus not only an accurate reflection of his marginalized position, it is 
also a distinctly self-marginalizing device. Naugga’s consistent and recurrent use of self­
deprecation is a wry gesture. He accepts, and even advertises, his own political poverty 
and thus implicitly calls into question the very meaning, and ultimately the value, of 
corresponding forms of wealth. Naugga has orchestrated a reversal: insofar as his self- 
marginalizing calls the nature of political authority into question, Naugga has taken the 
reins of power in this conversation for himself.
But if  we understand Naugga’s self-deprecation as ironic, we must remain 
sensitive to the plurality of its meanings. First, self-deprecation is an instance of self­
positioning, meaning that Naugga is both marginalized by the terms of the political 
system, but he is also willfully self-marginalized, that is, marginalized on his own terms. 
Second, Naugga’s use of self-deprecation also serves to suggest a level of absurdity in the 
distribution of political power. Here we find the sharpness of the ironic edge: Naugga’s 
self-deprecatory tendencies are juxtaposed with the lucidity of his insight. He 
undermines the declarative authority of his own voice through tone and word choice, but 
he remains a consistently sharp thinker whose clear, articulate questions are always one 
step ahead of the convoluted answers suggested by the text of the legislation. In other 
words, Naugga makes sense, and shows us where An Act does not. His use of self­
deprecation marks an ironic inversion of the correspondence between power and 
coherence.
It may be helpful at this juncture to recall the distinction between authorial stance 
and voice, or character. Naugga’s self-deprecation, read as an appropriation of power, is
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closely aligned with the authorial stance of the Letters: it is a direct reflection of Bigjim 
and Ito-Adler’s sense of social justice. The appropriation of power is not as closely tied 
to voice in the Letters. Ultimately, this reading of self-deprecation is more relevant to 
understanding the authors’ standpoint than it is in fleshing out the character of Naugga 
and his positioning in the Letters’ narrative.
The third broad function of irony that takes shape in the Letters to Howard 
(alongside its provisional and self-deprecating functions) is, as Hutcheon calls it, 
corrective. In cases where irony functions correctively, we find it being used generally 
“as a means of ridiculing—and implicitly correcting—the vices and follies of 
humankind,” although this is not necessarily to be understood as an exclusively 
contemptuous gesture, for Hutcheon notes a “very wide tonal range” within the corrective 
function, “from the playfully teasing to the scornful and disdainful” (Hutcheon 52-53).
The examples of irony drawn from the Letters to Howard thus far all contain a 
corrective dimension. Examples of self-deprecation include a corrective element insofar 
as they challenge both urban and white arrogance, as well as modern-time superiority or 
condescension toward villagers, Natives, and old-fashioned traditions by presenting 
discerning, cutting-edge political commentary in the voice of an old, rural Native man, 
Naugga. Recall that Naugga ironically belittles himself while simultaneously writing 
quite articulately about a highly complex legal situation and its associated tangle of 
political, social, and cultural ramifications. The effect of this irony, understood in its 
corrective dimension, is to flag a common conceptual error: that of bias. Systematic, 
institutionalized, and otherwise widely-held viewpoints that dismiss rural Native
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engagement in modern politics are problematized by Naugga’s ironic self-deprecation, 
which deals a fatal blow to the credibility of such bias.
I find compelling examples of corrective ironies in the letters dated April 10,
April 26, May 10, May 15, and July 23. In the interest of concreteness, I will consider 
the May 10 example here in order to reconstruct its specific corrective function. After the 
questions Naugga poses about land consecrated to parks, refuges, and sanctuaries, he 
writes, “Wally says that maybe we Natives should apply to the Federal Government for 
protection as an ‘endangered species’ ” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 30). The falsification of 
shared knowledge signals this statement’s irony; that is, we know that the term 
“endangered species” refers to something quite external to humans and human culture. It 
refers to terribly constrained, waning populations of animals, or perhaps of plants and 
lichens, but not to ourselves, not to people— even if we admit that there do exist terribly 
constrained, waning populations of certain kinds of people. The statement’s edge cuts 
into social notions of “us” and “them,” at once playing on the marginalization of Natives 
by exaggerating it into a full-blown taxonomical divide, while simultaneously grieving 
for the implications of this divide (as Nativeness becomes subsumed by dominant 
society, it draws fearfully close to extinction).
I read this statement as tonally closer to playful than to disdainful, but it is a wry 
playfulness that winces at itself and at its proximity to the truth. The statement’s 
corrective function takes the form of a reprimand: by suggesting that Natives apply to the 
Federal Government to be recognized as an endangered species, Naugga is tacitly giving 
the government a slap on the wrist for prioritizing some of its land allocations to the
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habitat needs of its wildlife rather than to the habitat needs of its indigenous peoples. He 
is, in all seriousness, indicating the potential for governmental land allocations to have 
life-threatening consequences for Alaska’s indigenous populations.
Parting Thoughts
In conclusion, irony in the Letters can be identified based on the way in which 
common or public knowledge is contradicted in the text, or based on the way that 
information within the text is twisted or inverted. These markers lead us to identify irony 
and its edge—that is, meaning that cuts more than one way, serving the provisional, self- 
deprecatory, or corrective functions. But as we look closely at examples of each of these, 
parsing our understanding of irony more and more finely, it paradoxically becomes 
evident that these functions are enmeshed. Aspects of ironic meaning constantly overlap, 
taking their perpetually shapeshifting forms on top of one another. In other words, self­
deprecation is also corrective, and as we locate more and more ironic meaning in that 
tacit realm between the lines, we see the evasion characteristic of the provisional function 
consistently taking shape in the shadows of the ironic edge. In conclusion to her 
examination of irony’s plural functions, Hutcheon writes the following paradoxical 
summation: “irony’s edge, then, would seem to ingratiate and to intimidate, to underline 
and to undermine; it brings people together and drives them apart” (Hutcheon 56). There 
is thus an implicit tension in the literary usage of irony, as it is a device that involves the 
constant collusion and collision of meanings, both of which are consistently borne out in 




Discursive Dimensions: the Politics of Irony 
Plural Meaning
As mentioned briefly in the beginning of Chapter Two, Hutcheon conceives of 
irony not as a rhetorical tool, but as the complex layers of meaning which result from a 
communicative process. While the task of Chapter Two was to focus on the shapes of 
that resulting meaning, this present chapter widens the scope of its attention to examine 
the communicative process itself. Philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy 
lays the groundwork for a theoretical consideration of communicative processes, and this 
chapter will draw from analyses of his thinking. The discussion at hand will thus rest on 
a two-part foundation made up of (1) Bakhtin’s ideas concerning dialogism, and (2) 
Hutcheon’s application of discursive concepts to her project of understanding irony.
Bakhtin’s dialogism, most simply introduced, frames a theory of knowledge. 
Scholar Michael Holquist helps further explain this philosophy in his book, Dialogism: 
Bakhtin and his World. Holquist notes that dialogism emerges at a time in history when 
knowledge is increasingly becoming understood as relative, or positional—that is, as a 
question of perspective (Holquist 17). Dialogism thus invokes interaction and the 
exchange of dialogue to explain what knowledge is and can be. In dialogic thinking, 
meaning is discursive: it comes from the always-evolving relation between self and other.
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Teun Van Dijk’s introduction to critical discourse analysis helps establish an 
understanding of the fluidity and necessarily relational aspects of discourse. He writes 
that critical discourse analysis
sees discourse—language use in speech and writing— as a form of 
‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a 
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and 
the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it.
. . .Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped. . . .It 
is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and 
reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes 
to transforming it. (Van Dijk 258, emphasis in original)
The first half of this passage recalls Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas about dialogism, the 
idea that perspectives in discourse are based on necessarily relational positioning. Van 
Dijk points out here that discourse occurs between events and their circumstances. And 
the second half of this passage acknowledges the way in which participation in discourse 
is necessarily multi-layered: participation reinforces a conversation rather like stoking a 
fire, but it also constitutes a perpetual reinscribing. With each new participatory move, a 
discourse is reinscribed into an ever-evolving present, altering it through time.
Making sense of history, the world, or both—that is, the ordering of chaos into 
patterned meaning—is a profoundly human endeavor. But Bakhtin argues that the price
we pay in so doing is that articulating, which is a form of organizing, and hence 
categorizing and defining, stultifies the world’s variety (Holquist 84). Yet he does not 
advocate chaos. Bakhtin believes in the human impulse to order the world into coherent 
schemas. A Bakhtinian ethic emerges here: he supports the body of utterances least 
destructive to “heteroglossia,” or diversity. As Holquist puts it, “heteroglossia is a 
plurality of relations, not just a cacophany of different voices” (89). In other words, 
Bakhtin supports “a polyphony of social and discursive voices” (Holquist 69), calling 
specifically for a non-authoritarian, openly conversational mode of making meaning.
Anthropologist Julie Cruikshank’s interpretation of Bakhtin helps us to pinpoint 
the philosopher’s intention: “[Bakhtin] saw what he called the ‘dialogic,’ relational 
possibilities of conversational storytelling as a model intrinsically opposing authoritarian 
speech” (Cruikshank, Do Glaciers Listen? 72). Bakhtin was in no position to take 
authoritarianism lightly; his dialogic philosophy was, in part, a response to the 
transformations he observed taking place in post-revolutionary Russia during the 1930s 
(Cruikshank, Do Glaciers Listen? 63). Cruikshank’s interest in Bakhtin stems from her 
work on oral narrative— a central concern of Bakhtin’s as well. But the Letters to 
Howard, while textual (not oral), are written conversationally—and in any case, as with 
all texts, they operate dialogically, putting events into conversation with their 
circumstances, characters into conversation with the times, authors into conversation with 
their readers, and so on. Bakhtin does, in fact, assign great importance to the discourse 
that takes shape in literature. He understands literary texts as utterances— 
communication that cannot be divorced from particular subjects, specific situations, and
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relational positioning (Holquist 68). The notion of simultaneity is central here: a text’s 
meaning exists on many levels simultaneously, and all these levels constitute dialogic 
exchange. At this point, the ethical dimension of dialogism emerges. For Bakhtin, a text 
is good when it presents dialogues otherwise obscured by dominant discourse, because in 
so doing, that text expands human consciousness (Holquist 83).
Attention to Bakhtin and his interpreters thus encourages us to examine the 
discursive qualities of the Letters to Howard. And Cruikshank’s observation about 
discourse as a natural opposition to authoritarian speech keys us in to the Letters' 
challenge to authority—that is, the authority of the dominant land claims narrative. 
Indeed, the Letters' unrelenting critique of the political system and its handling of Native 
Alaskan land claims runs counter to the dominant narrative of the times, which seems to 
have taken a generally celebratory stance regarding ANCSA (Arnold v, 145-146, and 
Berry 214). Accordingly, the Letters can be understood as a complicating— and thus 
important— contribution to Alaska’s land claims narrative.
Yet the Letters do not throw a tantrum. They do stake out an opposition to the 
dominant narrative, but they do so artfully. They are finely-calibrated to the cultural 
sensibilities of ancient heritage, to the social sensibilities resulting from contemporary 
ethnic dynamics, and to the political sensibilities of affluent, capitalist economics. It is, 
of course, essential to remember that the land claims narrative to which the Letters 
contribute is shaped by a great number of diverse and divergent interests, perspectives, 
and agendas, and that the Native contribution alone is complex: it is multi-faceted, 
fractured, and passionate. A discussion tracing the spectrum of all of the voices that
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make up the discourse on land claims— or even attention to the full spectrum of Native 
voices—is beyond the scope of both this chapter and this thesis. Rather, in the interest of 
maintaining a close alignment with this thesis’ central concern, I will now turn toward a 
consideration of the literary elements of voice and pacing in the Letters, each of which 
contribute to the unique discursive positioning of Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s work.
A Discursive Angle on Voice and Pacing
First, the Letters are written in what is an essentially likeable voice, one that is 
meant to strike a chord with its readers. Indeed, it is hard not to like Naugga. And 
because the cadence of this voice is rooted in the patterns and informality of spoken 
conversation, the Letters retain certain features of speech, particularly its potential for 
social savviness: they raise pointed, problematic questions, but include a healthy dose of 
self-deprecation, -minimizing, and -mockery. This sets up a relationship with the reader 
that involves a good deal of trust, rapprochement, and a degree of fondness as well. The 
Letters are thus able to treat contentious and problematic subjects without appearing to be 
either didactic or condescending. While it is their textual nature that dramatically 
expands the audience they reach—for this audience is spread thin over an enormous 
landscape—it is the conversational style of the Letters that allows them to tap into 
various strengths inherent in speech.
Furthermore, because the Letters did not, at first, constitute one document but 
were published over a period of nearly a year, their initial presentation in the Tundra 
Times tapped quite literally into the element of time that characterizes spoken
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conversation. The Letters are not a tirade: they inform, they think, they worry, they 
wonder— and they pause. These interludes of silence assume the reader’s participation. 
And as the Letters presently appear in book form, the separateness of each letter is 
preserved; each has its own chapter. Furthermore, most of the letters/chapters are 
separated by two- to twelve-page passages quoted from ANCSA. This sectional breaking 
of the whole text into individual letters is reminiscent of the pausing that spaced each 
letter’s original publication in the newspaper. Interludes of silence thus remain 
prominent in the pacing of the Letters. And whether these interludes are achieved 
through a letter-by-letter publication schedule or by hard sectional breaks in the collected 
Letters to Howard, they imply participatory involvement, elevating the silence both of 
time and of white space to the fore of the Letters ’ discursive qualities.
The voice and pacing of the Letters operate hand in hand. First, consider voice. 
The success of Naugga’s voice is the result of his characterization. In other words, 
Naugga resonnates with us: he is sharp-witted and articulate, but also modest, as well as 
grandfatherly and, at times, outright funny. His voice thus draws readers into a sort of 
friendship with the Letters, leveling the discursive playing field. Second, the pace of the 
Letters opens up room for discursive engagement, both assuming and insisting that the 
dynamic force of participation has a place here. Yet we must not make the mistake of 
understanding healthy discourse as boundless—in Bakhtinian thinking, the future of 
discourse is anticipated. It is limited by the discourse of the present. Thus the future, 
understood dialogically, does not encompass the vastness of infinite possibility— consider 
this theoretic conversational illustration: what is uttered at any point in conversation
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determines what can be coherently uttered in response. Barring non sequiturs, the 
possible scope of a statement is defined in large part by what it answers and by the path 
of the conversation leading up to it. In this sense, the future is both (a) what will happen, 
and (b) how present consciousness conceives of it.
rdIn the letter from July 23 , Naugga is concerned with evolving and eroding 
definitions of Nativeness. The letter takes a dark turn as Naugga gives voice to the 
emotional depth of his grievance:
You see what is bothering me, Howard. I have never been a person who 
has been afraid of progress, even though many times I prefer the 
traditional ways of our fathers. To me every change must be checked to 
see if it will be better or worse than what it is to replace. Change is not 
always progress. AN ACT is bringing many changes to our way of life, and 
I fear that not all of the them will be helpful for our people. The sad part 
is that we had a better chance to deal with mechanical things like airplanes 
and snow machines, than with the changes that this piece of paper, AN 
ACT, is bringing so quickly to our villages. It is almost like a disease that 
will pass over us ... and leave no living Natives in its wake. (Bigjim and 
Ito-Adler 64-65)
Here, the future that Naugga invokes is tragic. But it is the path to that future that 
is particularly interesting; the limits of Natives’ capacity to recalibrate in the face of
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change was, by Naugga’s lights, tested by the sudden infusion of mechanical inventions 
in day-to-day existence. Yet ANCSA is changing life so much more quickly than new 
technologies have that Naugga sees his people’s capacity for recalibration as insufficient. 
Change here takes on tidal proportions, and is portrayed as something that will wash over 
a way of life with enough speed to destroy it. Naugga sees this future not as potential, 
but as the product of something that is already in full swing.
This is a view of the future that also has discursive and semantic implications, for 
the question of whether Natives will or will not weather the tidal wave of change is a 
function of what defines “Native” in the first place. As Naugga consorts with this dark 
future in which no living Natives are left, he is implicitly returning to the question of how 
best to understand “Native” and seems to be suggesting that “corporate shareholder” be 
nixed from the possible definitions that might emerge. Thus the future—portrayed as 
hinging upon (or being in conversation with) the present— also plays a discursive role in 
hashing out current definitions of Nativeness.
A Timely Return to Irony
Hutcheon’s understanding of irony is inspired, in part, by these notions of 
dialogism. She writes,
Ironic meaning comes into being as the consequence of a relationship, a
dynamic, performative bringing together of different meaning-makers, but
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also of different meanings, first, in order to create something new and ... 
to endow it with the critical edge of judgment. (Hutcheon 58)
In this statement we recognize the basic features of dialogism, that mode of 
thinking which casts meaning as a product of relationship, as well as Hutcheon’s central 
point of interest, the ironic edge. The role of irony in the Letters to Howard will 
accordingly be considered in the remainder of this chapter specifically in terms of its 
discursive nature. This will be accomplished by tracing the arc of Hutcheon’s argument 
for a necessarily relational understanding of irony’s semantics.
In Hutcheon’s discussion, the dialogic nature of irony is exposed and explained 
specifically in terms of its “inclusive” qualities. The inclusive nature of ironic meaning 
involves the capacity to hear and understand more than one thing at once. “In 
interpreting irony,” writes Hutcheon, “we can and do oscillate very rapidly between the 
said and the unsaid. . i ro n ic  meaning is simultaneously double (or multiple)” (Hutcheon 
60, emphasis in original). Here, invoking its polyphonic property, Hutcheon makes a 
decisive move toward defining irony: “both the said and the unsaid together make up that 
third meaning,” she writes, “and I want to argue that this is what should more accurately 
be called the ‘ironic’ meaning” (Hutcheon 60, emphasis in original). With both the said 
and the unsaid working together (or rubbing against one another) to create something 
new, this “semantic ‘solution’ of irony would then hold in suspension the said plus 
something other than and in addition to it that remained unsaid” (Hutcheon 61, emphasis
in original; her references include Barthes 1977, Bakhtin 1984, and Herzfeld 1982). This 
additional meaning is the product of dialogic interaction.
A delicately-constructed example of irony occurs in the letter dated April 26,
1973. In it, Naugga writes to Howard about a young and distant relative of his, Joe 
Ayagtug, who comes in on the mail plane to visit. Joe, who lives in Anchorage, has 
recently accepted a job with one of the regional Native corporations. “Ayagtug” means 
“he went away” in Inupiaq (Ito-Adler, personal communication, May 5, 2011; confirmed 
by Bigjim, personal communication, September 16, 2011). The ironic play in this 
passage begins with the name itself: it is not a western name, and so bears a cachet of 
Native authenticity. But upon closer inspection (that is, on a semantic level), its meaning 
implies a breach of loyalty. Surface-level authenticity is paired with betrayal, or at least 
departure, and Joe Ayagtug’s name thus makes reference to the general and ongoing 
collision between tradition and modernization.
Because Joe has just accepted a job with one of the regional Native corporations, 
Wally asks him about the twelve-and-a-half million dollars that AN ACT is supposed to 
put into the Alaska Native Fund that fiscal year.
Joe Ayagtug said that as far as he knew, each Regional Corporation had 
received $500,000 so far from the Fund. With 12 Regional Corporations 
that added up to only $6,000,000, or one-half of the money that should 
have been in the fund. Wally said that he would like to have six million
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dollars in the bank earning 6% interest for a few months which sort of 
made Joe wonder what was going on. (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 21)
This anecdote shows a Native leader who is barely conversant in the functioning 
of an economic system in which he has agreed to participate. The letter suggests— 
without blame—that Native corporation leaders have a weak grasp of a system that is 
new to them. Note that Wally, the ex-VISTA volunteer (whom we assume has only a 
layperson’s understanding of the financial system) almost intuitively understands the time 
value of money and the process of accruing interest. Read one way, Wally understands 
that delaying payment is quite lucrative for the Federal Government, while Joe, now a 
Native leader in the new corporate world, just gets confused. The irony is in the 
inversion: Wally is an outsider but understands by virtue of his grasp on common 
knowledge how the system works. Joe, an insider in the corporation, has no frame of 
reference with which to understand finances.
Interpreted another way, Joe’s wondering “what was going on” may be 
understood not as confusion over Wally’s reaction to the finances but as suspicion of the 
Federal Government. If he is read as understanding Wally’s implications his wondering 
may carry an accusatory dimension.
To come at the dialogic nature of the irony as bluntly as possible, consider the 
layers of significance in this order: the “said” is that only one-half of the money promised 
to the Native corporations has been distributed. But this passage also implies that while 
Joe works for a Native corporation he does not understand basic finances, making up the
first layer of the “unsaid.” The further “unsaid” (here, the hinted) meaning is that the 
Federal Government is using this gap in Native knowledge to its own financial 
advantage. Dialogically superimposed the one on the other, they yield an additional 
meaning: the ironic warning that as Natives are given corporate control, there exists a 
danger of Native leadership becoming a form of puppeteering. The rub between said and 
unsaid predicts the problem of Native leaders being reduced to figureheads.
Transideological Politics
Implicit in the dialogic understanding that meaning itself is relational, or that 
meaning takes shape in the spaces between participants, utterances, or ideas, we 
encounter this basic assumption: that there are participants, utterances, or ideas, and that 
their positioning influences the space in which meaning takes shape. The chicken and 
egg question that intuitively ensues is, does community stake out and create the bounds 
of discourse, or does discourse stake out and create the bounds of community? Perhaps 
both forces work together symbiotically, but this is not yet the critical question.
Rather, as we narrow our focus to the issue of irony, the next iteration of the 
chicken and egg question becomes more pressing: does irony create discursive 
communities, or vice versa? As Hutcheon puts it, “irony ‘happens’ (and that’s the verb I 
think best describes the process)” (Hutcheon 5). But if  irony is understood as the 
defining force, it becomes a divider between those who “get” it and those who do not, or 
between those who ironize and those who are targeted by the irony. In other words, if 
irony precedes and defines community, then it does so by establishing a hierarchy
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separating those included either in understanding the irony or in the ironizing itself, and 
those excluded, either from understanding it, or because they are its target.
Hutcheon does not ascribe this level of social power to irony. She argues that it is 
only a literary and semantic tool, and that to the extent that social hierarchies are 
associated with the use and interpretation of irony, this is due to the norms and modus 
operandi of the discursive community itself (Hutcheon 97). Hutcheon’s answer to the 
chicken and egg question is thus that discursive communities set the scene for irony, 
making it possible in the first place (Hutcheon 18). In other words, it is the shared 
language of a particular discursive community that opens the space in which irony’s edge 
can carve out its multiple meanings. When the dimensions of the discursive community 
itself are understood to preceed, and thus define, the ironic possibilities within that 
discourse, irony is restored to its place as a specifically literary tool— one which we may 
consider in light of its role in discourse on social justice, but not one which either shuts 
off or privileges viewpoints in that discourse.
This orientation toward irony as something which does not define social hierarchy 
(but which can certainly comment on it) is the foundation of what Hutcheon call the 
“transideological” nature of irony. She writes, “irony can be provocative when its 
politics are conservative or authoritarian as easily as when its politics are oppositional 
and subversive” (Hutcheon 15). In other words, irony can be deployed from any and all 
political sides, and can undercut any of those sides as well. No single political 
orientation monopolizes irony. “This is part of the transideological nature of irony: 
people of all political persuasions have been known both to endorse and to condemn its
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use” (Hutcheon 46). It is a fine but important line: while irony can be used poignantly 
toward deeply partisan ends, it is, in itself, an essentially non-partisan tool.
This reference to partisan politics is not accidental. Irony is, in a sense, always 
political: it is bound up in power and its imbalances. “Irony explicitly sets up ... a 
relationship between ironist and audiences ... that is political in nature” (Hutcheon 17, 
emphasis in original)—in the sense that notions of hierarchy, subordination, judgment, 
and morality are invoked by irony. The stakes, in other words, are high.
Hutcheon distinguishes between a negative irony and a positive one. The ironist 
who stands outside the system, thus ironizing not the system but its product, assumes the 
powerful position of an external viewpoint which is not itself susceptible to the ironic 
edge. This is irony that tends to exclude and finalize (“negative” irony, in Hutcheon’s 
eyes). But “by contrast, the more constructive or ‘appropriative’ function of irony would 
target the system itselt, of which the ironist was also a part” (Hutcheon 17, emphasis in 
original). For Hutcheon, irony that targets a system in which it is in some way complicit 
broadly relativizes and relates (“positive” irony).
These ideas are reminiscent of Joseph Boskin’s ideas about political humor in 
general. The thrust of Boskin’s analysis is that the forms of power subjected to humorous 
and comedic scrutiny and skepticism in America are quite limited. He writes, “levity has 
been permitted only to the extent that it does not undermine the essential political 
structure or undercut its symbolic representation” (475). It is the political individual who 
is kept in the crosshairs of political joking. The defective character of the corrupt 
politician may be mocked mercilessly, but the system through which such a character was
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voted into power is typically not addressed. Boskin also notes that there is a distinct 
absence of humor surrounding the corporate world, leading him to ask, “does 
unquestionable immense power prevent such humorous in tru s io n .? ” (Boskin 479). His 
final conclusion is that the theory of an open society has been undermined by a political 
and economic system so sanctified that humor is barred from addressing it. And given 
America’s infatuation with the individual, it is natural that its humor should reveal an 
obsession with character— although this very obsession is what exposes the deficiency of 
American humor as a tool with which to confront and critique politics and economics at a 
systemic or institutional level.
The Letters to Howard certainly fit into the American vein of character-based 
humor. Yet they run utterly contrary to Boskin’s observations about the bounds brought 
to bear on comedic scrutiny. While not all humor is ironic3 , and not all irony is 
humorous, there can be notable overlap between the two— and the Letters do not by any 
means stop short or hold back in their system-level ironizing of either politics (involving 
countless Federal departments and bureaucracies) or economics (structured around a for- 
profit, corporate model). Rather, the Letters often target these systems explicitly— and in 
a further reversal of Boskin’s observations about American humor, they sometimes even 
go so far as to excuse the individuals presently participating so as to more sharply focus 
their scrutiny at the system itself.
3
As Hutcheon puts it, “the relationship between irony and humor is a vexed one . Not all ironies are 
amusing. Not all humor is ironic. Yet both involve complex power relations and both depend on social 
and situational context for their very coming into being” (Hutcheon 25 -26). Irony and humor, while not 
commensurable, share a significant plot of common ground in Hutcheon’s eyes: each treat or deal with both 
distribution and imbalances of power.
For example, when a traveling salesman from New York comes to the Land’s End 
Village to sell encyclopedias, Naugga sarcastically explains the encyclopedia company’s 
reasoning and arithmetic: “with only about 60,000 Natives in Alaska and according to 
Section (6) (a) (1) (A), a first fiscal year payment of $12,500,000, this should be enough 
money for each family to get a brand new refrigerator and a set of the New American 
World Encyclopedias!” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 36). The economic system and capitalistic 
venture are squarely targeted here. The salesman himself is spared blame; it is rather a 
way of thinking and the financial system that results from this thinking that is ridiculed. 
Herein we see one of the more admirable qualities of Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s work: in the 
medium of character-based letters to the editor, they find a toehold in public discourse; in 
their unwavering focus on systemic and structural problems, they do so on their own
4
terms .
History and Power— Framing Issues Through Story
Specifics of the Letters' discursive participation will next be examined in terms of 
their contribution to the historical record. In considering the intersection between 
narrative and history, I return to interpretations of Bakhtin. Cruikshank draws out his 
interest in and concern for history: “Bakhtin formulated the problem of history as its 
tendency to foster apparent randomness—for the order of events seemingly to 
disintegrate. And he saw active narrative storytelling as a constraining, countervailing
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The idea of Natives finding “a voice at the table” and doing so on their “own terms” is also explored in 
Schneider 2011.
force, working to hold things together” (Cruikshank, Do Glaciers Listen? 63). From his 
perspective of communist Russia, Bakhtin saw communication as a key challenge to 
hegemony. The Letters to Howard are not “active” in the sense of oral narrative 
performance. Nevertheless, the Letters participate actively in the telling of history: they 
frame issues associated with the Alaska land claims era with recourse to the literary tools 
of narrative, character, humor, and irony. Simply put, by storying the land claims with a 
voice of their own, the Letters do indeed function in opposition to what Bakhtin calls the 
randomness of history.
The Letters’ strongest accomplishment to this end might be in their unrelenting 
portrayal of the distribution of power. In other words, what Natives “get” in the land 
claims settlement is a function of what is most convenient for the government to give. 
This is taken up repeatedly in reference to the construction of the oil pipeline and the 
related rush to get ANCSA passed. On May 15, Naugga writes, “about half the period for 
land selection is o v e r .  With so little time and such complicated rules, how can we be 
expected to do such a thing w h e n . the State of Alaska has had thirteen years to select 
land that was to be taken from us by the Statehood Act?” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 32). 
Naugga thus protests the discrepancy between the pace of the State’s land selection 
process and that expected of Alaska Natives. It is evident that the timeline is set to favor 
the government. And on September 15, Naugga writes,
If you remember, AN ACT (Public Law 92-203) says in the beginning that 
‘there is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by
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Natives and Native Groups of Alaska’— Section 2(a). In the first place, 
the need for a ‘fair and just’ settlement is not only immediate now, it has 
been for some time. Where was Congress before there was an oil strike 
and an energy crisis? (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 87, emphasis in original)
Here, Naugga draws attention to the State’s ulterior motives in settling the Native 
land claims issue. It is ironic that at the time of the writing, a settlement of the land 
claims had been immediate among Natives for “some time,” whereas the U.S. 
government had only just then decided to recognize and declare that immediacy. The 
irony reveals disparate reasoning: a settlement matters to Natives for different reasons 
than it does to the State—but since Naugga underscores that it is on the State’s schedule 
that the land claims issue comes to the fore, the settlement is cast not as a Native 
accomplishment but as a governmental act of convenience. The Letters thus frame the 
story of the land claims settlement as a product of the State’s monetary greed. In this 
way the Letters to Howard unremittingly expose power relations and imbalances as the 
connective tissue between the shower of confusing, fragmented issues and concerns faced 
by Alaska Natives.
Like Bakhtin, Linda Tuhiwai Smith is concerned with the intersection between 
history and power. She writes, “history is mostly about power. It is the story of the 
powerful and how they became powerful, and then how they use their power to keep 
them in positions in which they can continue to dominate others” (Smith 34). Because 
the Letters to Howard so diligently work to point out where power resides, what seems to
drive it, where it is concentrated, and what structures reinforce its distribution, they may 
well be understood as playing a role similar to that of the “countervailing force” which 
Bakhtin believes narrative plays a vital role in contesting such authoritarian, domineering 
histories by constructing alternative, coherent frames.
For example, the November 7 letter targets the structure that reinforces and 
maintains a disparate distribution of power: “maybe the description of the White man’s 
culture as a ‘machine civilization’ is right after all. And we should think about that. Is it 
a way of life in which the machine rules and men have to adjust and conform to its needs 
and demands?” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 100). Naugga uses a rhetorical question here as a 
way of imploring his people to be critical of the Federal Government’s settlement with 
them. The comparison to a machine implies that insofar as Natives opt to participate in 
the dominant political and economic structure, they will do so at great expense because 
machines operate not with tapestries of individuality and ingenuity, but rather with 
assembly lines, or cogs and wheels. This passage underscores the imbalance of power 
between Natives and the “machine civilization”—while the machine civilization can 
operate with or without Natives, Native involvement will not elevate them beyond the 
status of pawns. Naugga is, to say the least, looking a gift horse in the mouth.
Hutcheon, maintaining her focus on the literary tool of irony, helps sharpen our 
focus on the power of narrative to contest dominant historical discourse. She explains 
that “irony’s intimacy with the dominant discourses it contests—it uses their very 
language as its said—is its strength, for it allows ironic discourse .  to buy time (to be 
permitted and even listened t o . ) ” (Hutcheon 30). Furthermore, she explains, by
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appropriating the power of the dominant authority via its language (and by inserting 
unsaid, “edgy” meanings therein), ironic discourse destabilizes that authority.
Consider the following example in which Naugga makes an ironic play on words. 
Regarding the Federal Government’s process of negotiating its relationship with 
indigenous peoples, he writes, “Wally Morton, my ex-VISTA friend, says t h a t .  the 
process used to be called termination, but now they sometimes call it self-determination” 
(Bigjim and Ito-Adler 91, emphasis in original). Naugga is wryly aligning colonial 
practices of aboriginal termination in the contiguous forty-eight with the contemporary 
political buzz concept of self-determination, a notion built on ideals of autonomy and 
independence. The word play exposes the present jargon as empty, serving to clothe 
unchanged hostility and disdain in politically correct language. But as in so many other 
examples, Naugga resorts to a self-deprecating deflection of authority (“Wally s a y s . ”). 
Herein lies the irony. The accusation is thinly—but finely—veiled, not quite appearing 
in the form of a good-faith history lesson, but certainly reminiscent of that innocence.
The statement is underlain with the bitter declaration that it is the letter and not the spirit 
of the law that has changed, but its form is softened, lightened, and delivered in a falsely 
naive tone that excellently mimics that of the dominant system’s typical, simplified, 
schoolroom treatment of history.
This impetus for contesting history is, at its core, part of the human project of 
making sense of the world. Walter Benjamin, a thinker who (like Bakhtin, Cruikshank, 
and Smith) is also interested in narrative, writes:
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one can go on and ask oneself whether the relationship of the 
storyteller to his material, human life, is not in itself a craftsman’s 
relationship, whether it is not his very task to fashion the raw 
material of experience, his own and that of others, in a solid, 
useful, and unique way. (Benjamin 108)
In the Letters to Howard, the “raw material of experience” is the way in which the 
land claims settlement unfolds in Alaska. A fashioning of this material constitutes 
participation in discourse, or a contribution to Alaska’s unfolding Native land claims 
narrative. In other words, fashioning the raw material of experience consists in making 
sense of it, and participating in discourse means recognizing that coherent depiction takes 
its position relative to other depictions. Paradoxically, one of the Letters’ most notable 
sense-making thrusts may be the confusion they expose.
The Letters to Howard involve a number of recurrent themes. They sniff out 
arbitrariness and expose the way in which arbitrary decisions distribute advantages and 
disadvantages. Recall that the Secretary of the Interior’s power in defining “Native,” for 
example, seems to be arbitrary, as does the definition itself (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 12). 
Arbitrariness here arranges power in the hands of the national government, not in the 
hands of locals or of Natives. As the Letters progress a pattern becomes evident in which 
arbitrary decisions are associated with limitations on Natives—in other words, what 
seems like arbitrariness is revealed to be systemic; present-day structures and strictures
defining the Federal Government’s relationship to Natives are patterned, or 
institutionalized.
The Letters to Howard also note various absurdities of the legal and political 
system. Recall the previously-quoted letter in which Naugga grapples with corporations 
and personhood—Wally “said that a corporation was a Person under the Law, and that 
this was an example of a legal fiction. But Wally had already told me a Person was a 
Human Being, and that fiction was a story that wasn’t true” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 18-19). 
The passage is funny because it is written with earnestness, yet its effect surpasses 
humor: legal complexity is shown to be absurd, but the task of becoming fluent in such a 
system is the more troubling subtext. By drawing attention to the absurd, the Letters to 
Howard also protest the way in which AN ACT’s absurdities systematically implicate 
Natives, demanding their cooperation with a system that does not make sense.
Alongside attention to absurdity is the issue of ambiguity. Subsurface rights, for 
example, are brought up in the letter posted May 10th and reappear in the November 14, 
1973 letter. In the latter Naugga writes, “Howard, do you know what ‘subsurface’ 
means? Wally and I are a little confused right now. We were wondering if  gravel was a 
subsurface particle or a surface particle” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 102). The various 
ambiguities of AN ACT become all the more troublesome when considered alongside the 
issue of arbitrariness. Questions not answered in the settlement take on an ominous air 
because of the seeming senselessness which will come to bear on their eventual 
resolution.
77
Finally, the Letters implore Natives to be critical of what the settlement gives 
them, both in concrete terms of material wealth and legal power, as well as in more 
abstract terms, which cast the settlement as a sort of club card giving Natives a structured 
entry into the western economic system via the corporate model. The Letters decry the 
arbitrariness, absurdity, and ambiguity of AN ACT, implying that whatever Natives gain 
by it will be fraught with those same characteristics, and that whatever Natives lose by it 
is likely to be permanently undone.
Tracing One Letter’s Irony
The remainder of this chapter considers a single letter in its entirety. The text of 
the letter appears first, unbroken by commentary. Following is a discussion of the 
various dimensions of irony operating within it.
Land’s End Village 
State of Alaska 
August 15, 1973
Dear Howard:
Do you remember when I told you that I was trying to learn how to 
speak the English language correctly with Wally Morton, my ex-VISTA 
friend for a teacher? Well, last night I almost gave up the whole thing.
We had a fellow from Anchorage out here in the village, who was a
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consultant to the Regional Corporation. He was trying to explain to us 
villagers how corporations were set up.
Now I thought that I knew a little bit about the subject since Wally 
had explained to me about shareholders, stocks, and the Board of 
Directors, but that turned out not even to be the half of it. This fellow told 
us so much about economics and law that my head is still spinning. There 
was stuff about business cycles, fiscal policy, profit ledgers, double-entry 
accounting, equity, liability, auditing, initial investment, and principal. I 
always thought that the principal was the fellow in the B.I.A. schools that 
whipped the students who had no interest in their work, but it turns out 
that the principal is the money that earns you interest if  you give it to 
somebody else to use. Apparently, from the way he put it, you don’t even 
have to do any work if you have this principal.
He then tried to explain inflation to us which really got me 
confused. The Federal government is supposed to print up the money in 
Washington, D.C. If they make too many dollars, then each one can buy a 
little less and in order to stay where you were, you have to be earning 
more. To stay still, you have to go faster I guess. Personally I never did 
like money very much anyway. In the old days we just bartered and 
traded for what we needed, but nowadays we seem to be needing so many 
more things—including money. I wonder if this is also inflation?
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We were also told about the marginal utility curves for supply and 
demand, and the fellow kept talking about guns and butter. To decide 
which to buy, he said we would compare the utility of an additional unit of 
butter with an additional unit of guns. Well, if  we lose our hunting and 
trapping rights as well as our land and we can’t fish anymore, neither guns 
or butter will be much use. He sort of got angry with me and said I didn’t 
really understand what “utility” meant. With all his talk about “guns and 
butter,” he didn’t know what a winter in the village meant either.
This could go on and on, Howard, but it just worries me when I 
realize how little prepared for the age of corporation which is dawning in 
our villages. According to AN ACT, Section 8 (a), the villages won’t even 
get the land they stand on if they aren’t organized into a corporation. So 
you can see how this worries an old man.
Your friend,
Naugga Ciunerput (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 71-73)
Naugga’s opening reference to English lessons carries ironic undertones. First, 
Naugga’s fluency in English is evident from his letters. Of course, Wally may be helping 
him with the writing; in a separate letter Wally explains that he is the one who has been 
drafting Naugga’s thoughts in the letters because Naugga “is still unsure of his English, 
and doesn’t know how to write yet, so he tells me what to say in the letters and I fix up 
the grammar, spelling, and punctuation” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 25). Wally’s claim here
can be interpreted literally, as part of the narrative surrounding Wally and Naugga’s 
relationship. But in order for Naugga to express the finer points of his thinking to Wally, 
he must have a strong grasp of the language and of the system of thought— so even if 
Wally’s claim is taken at face value, there is a discrepancy between statements about 
Naugga’s struggles with English and the reality of his communication skills.
Furthermore, Wally’s claim can also be interpreted as a joke making fun of the colonial 
impulse toward paternalism. The letters signed by Naugga are, after all, written in a 
different voice than Wally’s two letters, undermining the believability of the latter’s 
claim to be mediating all of Naugga’s ideas and opinions. Either way, the reference to 
language lessons is interacting with contradictory meanings; it is ironic.
On one level, the reference to language lessons mocks (to use Ito-Adler’s word) 
outsiders’ ignorance about Alaska’s Native peoples, falsely playing along with 
assumptions about Natives’ foreignness. This is its humorous dimension. But on another 
level, the reference to language lessons carries an ironic resonance with Alaska’s history 
of boarding schools in which students were forced to learn English and punished, often 
severely, for speaking their Native languages. The rub between this darker layer of 
meaning and the somewhat lighter one creates the tension characteristic of irony’s cutting 
edge.
The letter does not leave this resonance with boarding schools between the lines, 
but takes it up directly. Naugga uses word play to skip bisociatively between the 
corporate model of the present and the boarding school policies of the recent past; he 
arranges the financial meaning of “principal” next to its education administration
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meaning. In this way, Naugga uses a flair of the tricksteresque to link disparate 
meanings, juxtaposing a seemingly positive one (money making) and an obviously 
negative one (abuse within educational institutions). But the trick is livelier than just 
this: what first appears as juxtaposition may not be juxtaposition at all. In hopping 
between two disparate meanings it turns out that we do not have far to go from one to the 
other; the potential for financial success and the unhealed scars of boarding schools are 
tacitly exposed as faces of the same coin, that of cultural assimilation and demolition.
Keeping to its core concern with the financial quagmire Natives have been drawn 
into via corporate resource management, the third paragraph of the letter confronts the 
issue of inflation. The passage begins with a self-deprecatory admission of confusion.
Yet Naugga turns around and offers a fairly lucid interpretation of the phenomenon (“if 
they make too many dollars, then each one can buy a little less and in order to stay where 
you were, you have to be earning more”). We see here Naugga’s intentional self­
positioning: the passage simultaneously contains an acknowledgment of his marginalized 
position as well as a refusal that this marginalization strip his power as a critical 
commentator. More specifically, as a rural Native, Naugga’s background places him 
outside the dominant financial system; he must adopt a new language, if  you will, to join 
the conversation. Yet he joins in this conversation confidently and critically, displaying 
the clarity of fluency. His hesitation at the start is only mock hesitation, for while he 
owns up to being confused, his comments display both a thoughtful grasp of the system 
as well as an uncanny ability to explain that very system in simple, straightforward terms.
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Recourse to the device of self-deprecation thus allows Naugga to reverse notions of 
discursive fluency.
When Naugga takes the Anchorage corporate representative’s illustrations of 
guns and butter literally, we are forced to confront the notion of fluency from another 
angle. In this portion of the letter, it is not Naugga’s understanding or misunderstanding 
that is emphasized but rather that of the character from Anchorage. Naugga writes, “He 
sort of got angry with me and said I didn’t really understand what ‘utility’ meant. With 
all his talk about ‘guns and butter,’ he didn’t know what a winter in the village meant 
either” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 72-73). The crossed lines of communication are fully 
evident, as is the double standard: we can infer that the character from Anchorage expects 
Naugga to understand him, but does not expect to have to understand Naugga. This 
exchange illustrates the irony of the larger cultural one occurring between dominant 
society and rural Native society. The latter is expected to adjust to the former, while the 
former steamrolls forward on its existing path. Irony takes on a corrective function here. 
By exposing the asymmetry in dominant society / rural Native society dynamics, this 
passage of the letter corrects a critical misconception, showing that confusion and failure 
to understand—whether occasionally or systemically—may characterize not only one, 
but both of the groups.
This letter ends with a return to self-deprecation. Its final paragraph cites a 
passage from the legislation, expressing a simple, terrifying reality therein: that villages 
will not even own the land on which they are built unless they have been organized 
according to corporate principles. This portion of the letter fulfills its informational
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purpose. But the authors remain in character; Naugga’s voice remains strong. He refers 
twice to his worry and uses the diminutive terminology “old man.” This self-deprecatory 
turn at the end operates as a refusal: he refuses to play himself up or to denigrate the 
character from Anchorage (either as an individual character or as a symbol of dominant 
society), thus refusing to fully appropriate the power inherent in the role of critic, or to 
fully participate in the hierarchical power dynamic between criticizer and criticized. Yet, 
at the same time, Naugga does have the power of a critic—he has clearly turned a critical 
eye on various aspects of the financial system. This final instance of self-deprecation, 
then, redefines notions of authority by expanding the role of “critic” and challenging 
assumptions about the relationship one such critic must have to his target.
And So In the End
The Letters to Howard function on multiple discursive planes at once. As a voice 
of critique, observation, and questioning, they make up a lively contribution to the 
overarching narrative of land claims in Alaska. In the public discourse, the Letters to 
Howard sidle up to readers, both befriending them and spurring them to think about the 
more troubling aspects of the settlement, ranging from the corporate model’s disturbance 
of traditional Native lifeways to the disparity in power between the government and those 
whom the government’s decisions affect most directly. The Letters to Howard are, then, 
in conversation with other public portrayals of the land claims settlement, as well as with 
portrayals and projected images of, for example, the central tenets of democracy. In 
other words, implicit in the Letters’ treatment of the distribution of political power (in a
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government of the people, for the people, and by the people) is the question, which 
people? The Letters to Howard raise this and other questions in large part through 
recourse to the literary tools of narrative, characterization, voice, and irony. The Letters 
to Howard thus simultaneously participate in a metadiscourse, if  you will: they comprise 
a tacit commentary on literature and politics, combining characteristics of both into an 




This thesis has examined Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s Letters to Howard, taking a 
literary perspective on the Letters’ contribution to the narrative of land claims in Alaska. 
The Letters point out assumptions that still exist in various circles, like the conception 
that all Native corporate shareholders are rich. They raise concerns that were ultimately 
addressed, such as the “new Natives” issue. They suggest problems that have been borne 
out, such as the conflict of interest stemming from clashes between stewardship 
responsibility inherent in resource management and corporations’ for-profit missions.
This thesis thus examines the ways in which the Letters constitute a voice of 
prescient dissent regarding ANCSA. The role of irony has been my emphasis throughout, 
for irony creates many of these layers of meaning which the Letters bring to the table. 
Structurally—that is, by layering meaning—irony contributes to the Letters' prescience 
by anticipating the convergence of seeming contradictions and the coexistence of 
divergent truths. For example, there is an ongoing, uneasy simmering that has and 
continues to characterize questions of resource management. This results from the 
unresolvable tension in the present day between for-profit corporate logic on one hand 
and the spirituality of a peoples’ historic and cultural ties to those same resources on the 
other.
As Hutcheon has helped define it, this critical edge both introduces and insists on 
a basic multiplicity of voices. There is a pluralizing force in irony, requiring a mental
doubling for ironic interpretation. In this sense, the core result of irony is that it infuses a 
conceptual plurality into the confines of otherwise limited narrative or discursive spaces.
Three types of ironies identified by Hutcheon dominate the ironic landscape of the 
Letters. The first is classified as provisional irony, which implies meanings without 
owning up to them. This kind of irony evades responsibility for some portion of the 
meaning it imparts, as in Naugga’s introduction of Wally as an old VISTA volunteer who 
got lost and was never evacuated— a statement which hints at tensions between groups 
not explicitly defined, such as charitable donor/receiver, urban/rural, and 
modern/traditional. The statement thus suggests friction while evading discussion of it. 
Secondly, corrective ironies challenge the arrogance, sense of superiority, and 
condescension that spans social divides like those mentioned above, as well as in 
additional pairings like white/Native and young/old. Irony in the Letters frequently 
operates (in part) to correct bias between groups like these.
The third form of irony prevalent in the Letters is self-deprecation. This is most 
noticeable in the Letters’ recurrent use of diminutive terminology. In addition to word 
choice, Naugga (in whose voice the majority of the Letters are written) favors the softer 
rhetoric of questioning over direct statement and relies heavily on the deflection of 
authority through reported speech, the cumulative result of which carries the same 
defensive or protective impulses found in self-deprecation. Naugga’s positioning relative 
to society and politics is thus achieved by the trope of the self-diminution. He plays up 
his politically marginalized position, but self-deprecation is juxtaposed with the clarity of 
the insight expressed in the Letters. In this way, he calls the nature of political authority
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itself into question, ultimately taking the communicative reins of power into his own 
hands. The sharpness of the ironic edge is here, first in the inversion of the correlation 
between power and coherence, and second in the resultant redefining of what constitutes 
authority in the first place.
Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy helps expand this view of irony in the Letters. For 
Bakhtin, meaning is discursive: it arises from the relation between two subjects. And 
discourse is, according to Bakhtin, particularly valuable because it functions in 
opposition to authoritarian speech. The Letters, dialogically understood, challenge the 
dominant land claims narrative. They reframe history, contesting and retelling it with 
recourse to literary tools such as characterization, narrative, and irony. Indeed, irony is 
itself dialogic by nature; it involves a plurality of meanings akin to the voices 
participating in a conversation. And the ironic rub between the said and the unsaid gives 
rise to a third, specifically relational meaning. Recall Joe Ayagtug’s statement about the 
Native corporations having only received one-half of the money promised (Bigjim and 
Ito-Adler 21), a passage in which the said (stated above) and the unsaid (that uneasy 
feeling that the Federal government is taking advantage of gaps in Natives’ financial 
knowledge) give rise to a third, suspended meaning: the concern that Native leadership 
could be reduced to the farcical role of figureheads.
Dialogism also contributes to our perspective on the macrocosm of the Letters. 
Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic anticipation is reflected in the collection as a whole: their 
progression displays an anticipatory momentum that arrives at a philosophical 
culmination in the letter dated July 23. The earliest letters build a concrete foundation for
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a critical perspective of ANCSA, discussing the definition of Native, the power of the 
Secretary of the Interior, and the logistical difficulties posed by Native Enrollment forms. 
These tangible discussions lead up to the April 17 letter, which contains a more 
philosophic critique of clashing value systems. Then there is another wave of letters that 
focus on practical concerns, building to the second, darkly philosophical letter. This one 
is dated July 10, and considers the value of villagers’ connection to place, their 
knowledge of wildlife patterns, and the risks both of severing this connection and of 
managing resources without this knowledge. One letter separates this one from the 
culmination of the collection, the letter dated July 23, in which Naugga shows that the 
legislation is insidiously dismantling a people’s culture, and hence their very existence, 
from the inside out. He does so first by declaring that “change is not always progress” 
(Bigjim and Ito-Adler 64), a notion at the core of the Letters' critical perspective on 
ANCSA. Within a few short sentences following this one, Naugga goes on to predict the 
eventual annihilation of his people by comparing the new legislation to a disease that will 
“leave no living Natives in its wake” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 65). Intervals first of 
practical and then of philosophic critique build with anticipatory momentum toward this 
point of culmination.
In combination with its discursive elements, irony can also be deployed for 
subversive and counter-hegemonic purposes for it can target notions of power, hierarchy, 
subordination, judgment, and morality. The Letters, in particular, employ irony to 
critique institutionalized ills existing in both the political and economic systems. Bigjim 
and Ito-Adler’s writing exposes power relations and imbalances in both form and content.
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The specifically dialogic, or pluralizing aspect of the irony they use poses a challenge to 
the rigidities of a systemically biased democratic republic. In addition, the content of the 
Letters is explicitly political. They criticize the economic system that has introduced for- 
profit corporations to manage a peoples’ settlement money and traditional lands, they 
criticize the politics of land designations and resource management, and they criticize the 
politics of identity and the entanglement of ethnicity with economics.
At this juncture it may be possible to take a step back. This thesis has developed 
a focused understanding of the Letters' combined literary and political elements. Yet 
these still merit probing discussion within the overarching discourse of humor. As has 
been suggested but not fully developed in this thesis, much of the irony in the Letters to 
Howard is funny— although sometimes it is just sad. While it is not my intent to conflate 
humor with irony, I am confident in asserting that there is still considerable overlap 
between the two in Bigjim and Ito-Adler’s work. Irony and humor work together, 
reinforcing one another in the Letters, but further discussion on how the two operate in 
tandem is in order. While such a discussion is far beyond the scope of my work here, I 
would like to conclude by planting some of the seeds that may prove to be fruitful in 
future analyses.
In his article on humor and ethnic identity, John Lowe invokes Bakhtin’s ideas to 
develop a dialogic understanding of humor. He explains that humor requires a forced 
juxtaposition of opposites, and that this results in a discursive Bakhtinian plurality. In 
other words, “comic forms open up and atomize” (Lowe 84), meaning that humor
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distinguishes between constitutive elements, drawing out juxtaposition, both 
acknowledging and emphasizing the contradictions inherent in experience.
In this sense, humor has much in common with the pluralizing effects of irony. 
But as Joseph Coulombe pinpoints it in his article on Sherman Alexie’s work, humor is 
defined by its fluidity, its paradoxes, and its ability to surprise (95). Juxtaposition and 
paradox, those situations in which contrast and multiplicity are highlighted, represent the 
territory in which irony and humor are bound up in one another. But if  humor maintains 
an identity that is distinct from irony’s, perhaps it is, as Coulombe suggests, in the 
fluidity that leads to an element of surprise. The hallmark response to humor is, after all, 
laughter: that startled, often vocalized series of sharp, uneven exhales. Shifting to an 
inquiry into the humor of the Letters may involve honing a sensibility to the role of 
surprise therein.
Funniness in the Letters comes not from the surprise of, say, punchlines, but 
rather mimics the ironic meaning held in suspension between the said and the unsaid.
That is, it is a humor that arises from relational positioning. In other words, there is a 
double-mindedness involved in experiencing the humor in the Letters. For example, 
when we find out that Naugga and Wally are teaching each other their respective 
languages, it is funny that the language lessons have been “pretty one-sided” (Bigjim and 
Ito-Adler 11). They are reading U.S. federal legislation together, a surprising choice for 
two-way language lessons because it gives Wally plenty of material with which to teach 
English, and gives Naugga exactly zero in terms of Inupiaq material. The humor is 
understated, arising from a sort of triangulation between details.
91
While the humor in the Letters is largely ironic (rather than, for instance, 
slapstick), the irony in the Letters is not always humorous. Sometimes the critical edge 
of irony cuts out several meanings which do not cause the surprise characteristic of 
humor. For example, in the last letter to appear in the collection, Naugga mentions 
Secretary of the Interior Roger Morton’s comparison of the Alaska Pipeline to the 
Egyptian pyramids. Naugga relates what he has learned from Wally, namely, that the 
pyramids were built with slave labor for religious purposes. “Maybe the Pipeline is being 
built by the Government for the religious purpose of preserving the American Economy,” 
writes Naugga, “ but now they won’t need slaves since there are so many unemployed 
people” (Bigjim and Ito-Adler 104). One layer of irony in this passage may be in the 
juxtaposition between religious and economic values, but these two have been entangled 
across myriad cultures throughout history, so while stark, it is not a particularly 
surprising contrast. Another layer of irony may be in the initial pipeline-pyramid 
comparison, as well as in the parallel implied between the labor of those who are forcibly 
conscripted and those whose desperation for work precludes the necessity for 
conscription. Again, the relational positioning is ironic, but lacks the element of fluid 
surprise that might generate laughter: invoking the helplessness of forced laborers seems 
not to surprise but rather to confirm readers’ (perhaps latent) sense of the helplessness 
experienced by the unemployed.
Careful attention to irony has thus created a foundation for further inquiry into 
humor. Perhaps analysis of irony and its humorous spins can contribute to developing a 
literary ethic: humor has the humanizing capacity to bridge differences through shared
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laughter, but conversely, humor can also illuminate those very differences, undermining 
the homogenizing forces which have become so problematic as globalization has spread. 
In his oft-quoted chapter from a collection called Custer Died For Your Sins, Vine 
Deloria suggests that humor can be understood as a method of rapprochement, shedding 
light on foreign mindsets. He writes,
One of the best ways to understand a people is to know what makes them 
laugh. Laughter encompasses the limits of the soul. In humor life is 
redefined and accepted. Irony and satire provide much keener insights 
into a group’s collective psyche and values than do years of research.
(Deloria 146)
A sensitivity to humor in the Letters may, then, give readers further access to the 
psychology of political critique specific to Alaska’s land claims era. In addition, Bigjim 
and Ito-Adler’s use of humor in carrying out their project of critique can be appreciated 
for its strategic value: with Deloria’s words in mind, we can infer that a voice which 
communicates through humor can achieve the ring of authenticity and clarity necessary to 
strike a chord deep within its audience. Meticulous attention to irony and its pluralizing 
effects on discourse can offer a navigable path into this broader subject of humor, 
creating a platform from which to deepen a reading of the Letters to Howard. 
Furthermore, heightened sensitivity to the partnership between irony and humor may help 
us to approach other instances of contemporary Native American literature as well.
When such work is undertaken, we may find ourselves with one more point of entry into 
what Deloria refers to as the collective psyche, a lucid view of which is always one of a 
reader’s ultimate goals, for it is this view that reveals the idiosyncratic elements of 
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